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This paper considers semiparametric identification of structural dynamic discrete choice models
and models for dynamic treatment effects. Time to treatment and counterfactual outcomes
associated with treatment times are jointly analyzed. We examine the implicit assumptions of the
dynamic treatment model using the structural model as a benchmark. For the structural model we
show the gains from using cross equation restrictions connecting choices to associated
measurements and outcomes. In the dynamic discrete choice model, we identify both subjective
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This paper presents econometric models for analyzing time to treatment and the conse-
quences of the choice of a particular treatment time. Treatment may be a medical interven-
tion, stopping schooling, opening a store, conducting an advertising campaign at a given date
or renewing a patent. Associated with each treatment time, there can be multiple outcomes.
They can include a vector of health status indicators and biomarkers; lifetime employment
and earnings consequences of stopping at a particular grade of schooling; the sales revenue
and pro￿t generated from opening a store at a certain time; the revenues generated and mar-
ket penetration gained from an advertising campaign; or the value of exercising an option
at a given time. Our paper unites and contributes to the literatures on dynamic discrete
choice and dynamic treatment eﬀects. For both classes of models, we present semiparametric
identi￿cation analyses.
The conventional treatment eﬀect literature is static.1 It ignores choice equations and
only focuses on outcome equations.2 We extend the literature on treatment eﬀects to model
choices of treatment times and the consequences of choice. We link the literature on treat-
ment eﬀects to the literature on precisely formulated structural dynamic discrete choice
models generated from index models crossing thresholds. We show the value of precisely
formulated economic models in extracting the information sets of agents, in providing model
identi￿cation, in generating the standard treatment eﬀects and in ruling out hard-to-interpret
counterfactuals that can be generated from reduced form models.3 With an articulated choice
model in hand, it is possible to interpret, and relax, recent assumptions made in the treat-
ment eﬀect literature.
Our analysis of identi￿cation in dynamic discrete choice models is of interest in its own
1Robins (1989, 1997), Gill and Robins (2001) and Abbring and Van Den Berg (2003) are important
contributions to the dynamic treatment eﬀects literature.
2See Heckman (2006) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2006a).
3Aakvik, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2005), Heckman, Tobias, and Vytlacil (2001, 2003), Carneiro, Hansen,
and Heckman (2001, 2003) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) show how standard treatment eﬀects can be
generated from structural models.
1right. Rust (1994) provides a comprehensive survey of models in the ￿eld up to a decade ago
and the ￿eld is burgeoning.4 He shows that without additional restrictions, a class of in￿nite
horizon dynamic discrete choice models for stationary environments is nonparametrically
nonidenti￿ed.5 His paper has fostered the widespread belief that dynamic discrete choice
models are identi￿ed only by using arbitrary functional form and exclusion restrictions.6 The
entire dynamic discrete choice project thus appears to be without empirical content and the
evidence from it at the whim of investigator choices about functional forms of estimating
equations and application of ad hoc exclusion restrictions.
This paper establishes the semiparametric identi￿ability of a class of dynamic discrete
choice models for stopping times and associated outcomes in which agents sequentially update
the information on which they act. We also establish identi￿ability of a new class of reduced
form duration models that generalize conventional discrete time duration models to produce
frameworks with much richer time series properties for unobservables and general time-
varying observables and patterns of duration dependence than conventional duration models.
Our analysis of identi￿cation of discrete time duration models does not require conventional
period-by-period exclusion restrictions. Instead, we rely on curvature restrictions across
the index functions generating the durations that can be motivated by dynamic economic
theory.7
The key to our ability to identify the structural model is that we supplement infor-
mation on stopping times or time to treatment with additional information on measured
consequences of choices of time to treatment as well as measurements. The current dy-
namic discrete choice literature focuses exclusively on the discrete choices. Economic theory
generally imposes restrictions across transition and outcome equations. This information
4See Taber (2000); Magnac and Thesmar (2002) and Aguirregabiria (2004), among other important recent
contributions.
5However, Rust￿s proof is for a stationary environment, in￿nite horizon, dynamic programming problem
with recurrent states and does not use any information about concavity of utility functions or information
connecting outcomes and choices.
6See for example the discussion in Magnac and Thesmar (2002).
7See Heckman and HonorØ (1989, 1990) for examples of such an identi￿cation strategy in duration models
and Roy models. See also Cameron and Heckman (1998).
2provides identifying power only in fully articulated dynamic discrete choice models where
choice equations are clearly delineated and are related to outcome equations, and not in
reduced form analyses where the choice equation is left implicit. Our analysis demonstrates
the power of economic theory in analyzing and interpreting models of treatment eﬀects.
With our structural framework, we can distinguish objective outcomes from subjective out-
comes (valuations by the decision maker). Applying our analysis to health economics, we
can identify the causal eﬀects on health of a medical treatment as well as the associated
subjective pain and suﬀering of a treatment regime for the patient. Attrition decisions also
convey information about agent preferences about treatment.8
We do not rely on the assumption of conditional independence of unobservables, given
observables, that is used throughout much of the dynamic discrete choice literature.9 Similar
assumptions underlie recent work on reduced form dynamic treatment eﬀects in matching.10
Our semiparametric analysis generalizes matching. In this paper, some of the variables that
would produce conditional independence and would justify matching if they were observed
are treated as unobserved match variables. They are integrated out and their distributions
are identi￿ed.11
For speci￿city, throughout this paper we take as our principle example the choice of
schooling and its consequences. Persons who start life in school may stop at diﬀerent grades
with consequences for their earnings, employment and other aspects of their socioeconomic
trajectories. If each grade takes one period to complete, we can think of this model as
a time to treatment model where the ￿treatment￿ is the grade at which a person ￿stops
treatment￿ or drops out of school. Persons with diﬀerent ￿treatment times￿ (attained levels
of schooling) may have diﬀerent lifetime employment and earnings outcomes while in school
and afterward. Associated with each schooling attainment level (treatment time), may be
8See Heckman and Smith (1998). Use of participation data to infer preferences about outcomes is devel-
oped in Heckman (1974).
9See, e.g. Rust (1987), Manski (1993), Hotz and Miller (1993) and the papers cited in Rust (1994).
10See, e.g. Gill and Robins (2001) and Lechner and Miquel (2002).
11For estimates based on this idea see Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003), Aakvik, Heckman, and
Vytlacil (2005), Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005a,b,c,e), and Heckman and Navarro (2006).
3measurements on IQ, genetic biomarkers and the like that may be used to proxy unobserved
traits of the individuals being studied.
This paper proceeds in the following way. Section 2 presents our basic framework and
establishes identi￿cation theorems for reduced form single spell duration models with general
forms of duration dependence and heterogeneity. It is diﬃcult to make some important eco-
nomic distinctions within this model and the unrestricted model has some peculiar features
that are diﬃcult to interpret within a well posed economic model. Section 3 builds on the
framework of Section 2 and develops identi￿cation conditions for a model of dynamic discrete
choice and associated counterfactual outcomes with information updating and option values.
Section 4 relates our analysis to previous work. Section 5 concludes. In a companion paper,
Heckman and Navarro (2006), we apply our analysis to panel data on schooling choices and
lifetime earnings to estimate both reduced form and structural models.
2 Semiparametric Duration Models and Counterfactu-
als
A basic building block for the analysis of this paper, of interest in its own right, is a semi-
parametric index model for dynamic discrete choices that extends conventional discrete time
duration analysis. This framework can be used to approximate dynamic discrete choice
models. The exact nature of the approximation is usually obscure, as is true of many mod-
els of treatment eﬀects in economics and statistics. We allow for nonparametric duration
dependence that can be generated by duration-speci￿c regressors. We make explicit the un-
observables that drive reduced form duration and heterogeneity dynamics. We separate out
duration dependence from heterogeneity in a semiparametric framework more general than
conventional discrete time duration models. We produce a new class of reduced form mod-
els for dynamic treatment eﬀects by adjoining time-to-treatment outcomes to our duration
model.
4We ￿rst develop the time to treatment equation. In terms of our running example,
the treatment time is the grade (age) at which a person stops schooling. The models we
analyze throughout this paper are based on a latent variable for choice at time t by per-
son i, Ii(t)=μt (Zi(t),ηi(t)),w h e r et h eZi(t) are observables and ηi(t) are unobservables
from the point of view of the econometrician. In Section 3, we derive Ii(t) from a speci￿c
economic model. Treatments at diﬀerent times may have diﬀerent outcome consequences
which we model after analyzing the time to treatment equation. De￿ne Di(t) as an indi-
cator of receipt of treatment at date t for individual i.T r e a t m e n t i s t a k e n t h e ￿rst time
Ii(t) becomes positive. Thus Di(t)=1[Ii(t) > 0,I i(t − 1) ≤ 0,I i(t − 2) ≤ 0,...] where the
indicator function 1[•] takes the value of 1 if the term inside the braces is true.12 We derive
conditions for identifying a model with general forms of duration dependence in the time to
treatment equation. To simplify notation, we drop the ￿i￿ subscript throughout the paper.
In discussing identi￿cation, we assume access to panel data on individuals with observations
statistically independent across persons, but potentially dependent across time for the same
person.
2.1 Single Spell Duration Model
Individuals are assumed to start spells in a given (exogenously determined) state and to exit
the state at the beginning of time period T = t.13 In our schooling example, an individual
starts school and drops out in period T. T is thus a random variable representing total
completed spell length. It can also be interpreted as time to treatment (i.e.,t h ea g e n tw a i t s
in the no treatment state t − 1 periods and exits into treatment at the beginning of period
T = t).14 Let D(t)=1if the individual exits at time t and D(t)=0otherwise. In our
12This framework captures the essential feature of any stopping time model. For example, in a search
model with one wage oﬀer per period, Ii(t) is the gap between market wages and reservation wages at time
t.S e e ,e.g. Flinn and Heckman (1982). This framework can also approximate the explicit dynamic discrete
choice model analyzed in Section 3.
13Thus we abstract from the initial-conditions problem discussed in Heckman (1981b).
14T = t designates either completion of a treatment regime at t or else the date at which treatment is
received.
5schooling example where each year of school takes one period to complete, t is the number
of years of completed schooling for people who start in school.15 Treatment at t consists
of dropping out at the beginning of period t. The event D(t − 1) = 0 signi￿es that an
individual remains in the no treatment state at t − 1. We impose an exogenously speci￿ed
initial condition D(0) = 0. In a schooling example, ﬂ T is the highest possible grade that can
be completed and D(0) = 0 means that everyone starts with zero years of schooling.
In an analysis of drug treatments, T = t is the discrete time period in the course of an
illness at the beginning of which the drug is administered. There may be a maximum duration
of the illness ﬂ T beyond which treatment cannot be administered. It is possible in this example
that D(0) = 0,...,D(ﬂ T)=0 , so that a patient never receives treatment. In the schooling
example, ￿treatment￿ is not schooling, but rather dropping out of schooling. In this case, if
there is an upper limit ﬂ T to the number of years of schooling, if D(0) = 0,...,D(ﬂ T −1) = 0,
then D(ﬂ T)=1 . Our analysis applies to both cases, but we focus on the schooling example
because it links the analysis of this section to the analysis of Section 3.
In the context of this model, there is no meaningful event corresponding to the outcome
D(t)=0and D(t−1) = 1,s ot h eD(t) have a natural sequential structure: (D(0),D (1),...,
D(t)) = (0,0,...,1). For a given stopping time t,w ed e n o t eb yDt the truncated sequence
consisting of the ￿rst t +1elements (from 0 to t)o fD. In the course of our discussion,
we will make use of the random variables D(t) and Dt for ￿xed t, t =1 ,...,ﬂ T. By abuse
of notation, we will designate by d(t) and dt values that these two random variables can
assume. Thus, d(t) can be zero or one and dt is a sequence of t +1elements consisting of a
nonempty subsequence of zeros followed by a (possibly empty) subsequence of ones. For a
sequence of all zeros, we will write Dt =( 0 )and dt =( 0 )regardless of the length of these
subsequences. Let Z(t)=z(t) denote regressors determining transitions from time t − 1 to
time t.L e tﬂ T (< ∞) be the upper limit on the time the agent being studied can be at risk
for a treatment.
15We assume that once out of school a person does not attend again. Alternatively, we use years attended
rather than grade completed as the measure of schooling.








t−1 =( 0 ) ,t =1 ,...,ﬂ T, (1)
where μt (Z(t),η(t)) = Z(t)γt − η(t).T h e D(t) outcome is observed only if D(t − 1) = 0,
which is equivalent to Dt−1 =( 0 ) .T h e Z(t) are regressors that enter the index at period
t.T h e Z(t) can include expectations of future outcomes given current information in the
case of models with forward-looking behavior. To identify period t parameters from period
t outcomes, one must condition on all past outcomes and control for any selection eﬀects.
The assumption of linearity of the index in Z(t) is not critical to our analysis, and this
assumption can be relaxed following arguments in Matzkin (1992, 1993, 1994). Appendix B
presents the class of nonparametric functions identi￿ed by Matzkin. We call them Matzkin
functions. Using Matzkin (2003), we can also relax the separability assumption, but we do





,a n dl e tη =( η(1),...,η(ﬂ T)).16 We assume that Z is statis-
tically independent of η.L e tγ =( γ1,...,γﬂ T). Depending on the values assumed by γt, we
can generate very general forms of duration dependence that depend on the values assumed
by the Z(t). We thus allow for period-speci￿ce ﬀects of regressors on the latent indices
generating choices.
This model is the reduced form of a general dynamic discrete choice model. Like many
reduced form models, the link to choice theory is not clearly speci￿ed. It is not a conventional
multinomial choice model in a static (perfect certainty) setting with associated outcomes. As
16A special case of the general model arises when η(t) has a factor model representation,
η(t)=αtθ + ε(t), t =1 ,...,ﬂ T where α1 =1 ,
w h e r ew ea s s u m et h a tε(t) ⊥ ⊥ ε(t0),f o rt 6= t0,t h a tε(t) ⊥ ⊥ θ,w h e r e￿ ⊥ ⊥￿ denotes statistical independence,
and that (θ,ε(1),...,ε(ﬂ T)) is jointly independent of Z.S e t t i n gαt =1for all t generates the conventional
permanent-transitory model.
7a point of reference, we present such a model in Appendix C and consider its identi￿ability.
We analyze the model based on equation (1) because it extends conventional discrete time
duration analysis and because our analysis of identi￿cation in this simple setting produces
results that are useful for securing identi￿cation in the more explicit structural model of
Section 3.
2.2 Identi￿cation of Duration Models with General Error Struc-
tures and Duration Dependence
We ￿rst establish semiparametric identi￿cation of the model of equation (1). We assume
access to a large sample of i.i.d. (D,Z) observations. Let Zt =( Z(1),...,Z(t)), γt =
(γ1,...,γt). We can nonparametrically identify the conditional probability Pr(D(t)=
d(t)|Zt,D t−1 = dt−1) a.e. FZt|Dt−1=dt−1 where FZt|Dt−1=dt−1 is the distribution of Z con-
ditional on previous choices. We assume that (γ,Fη) ∈ Γ ￿H ,w h e r eΓ ￿His the pa-
rameter space. Our goal is to establish conditions under which knowledge of Pr(D(t)=
d(t)|Z,Dt−1 = dt−1) a.e. FZ|Dt−1=dt−1 allows us to identify a unique element of Γ ￿H .W e
de￿ne identi￿cation in a standard way.
De￿nition 1. Let Pγt,Fηt(D(t)=1 |Zt = zt,D t−1 = dt−1) be the probability of observing
the choice D(t)=1conditional on observables Zt = zt and past choices Dt−1 = dt−1
under model (1) when the parameter values are given by (γt,F ηt).L e tΓ￿Hbe the space of



















To secure identi￿cation of all of the models in this paper, we follow an identi￿cation-in-
17Alternatively, we could de￿ne identi￿cation in terms of the joint distribution of D(t) and Z given
Dt−1 = dt−1 rather than in terms of the conditional distribution of D(t).
8the-limit strategy that allows us to recover the (γt,F ηt) by conditioning on large values of the
indices of the preceding choices. This identi￿cation strategy is widely used in the analysis
of discrete choice.18
We now establish suﬃcient conditions for the identi￿cation of model (1).
Theorem 1. For the model de￿ned by equation (1), assume the following conditions:
(i) ηt ≡ (η(1),...,η(t)) is statistically independent of Zt =( Z(1),...,Z(t)), t =1 ,...,ﬂ T,






,w h e r e−∞ ≤
η(j) < ﬂ η(j) ≤ +∞ for all j =1 ,...,ﬂ T, and the joint distribution does not depend
on γt,
(iii) (Full Rank of Z(t))F o ra l lj =1 ,...,t, Z(t) is a Kt-dimensional random variable.
There exists no proper linear subspace of RKt having probability 1 under FZ(t).T h e r ee x -






with gt ≥ ￿ gt (componentwise), there exists no proper linear subspace of RKt having
probability 1 under FZ(t)|Z(1)γ1≥g1,...,Z(t−1)γt−1≥gt−1.
(iv) (Inclusion of Supports) Supp
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,f o rt =1 ,...,ﬂ T, where the boundary
points
'
η(t),ﬂ η(t):t =1 ,...,ﬂ T
“
are not functions of γt for t =1 ,...,ﬂ T,where ￿Supp￿
means support. The supports can be unbounded.
Then Fηt and (γt) are identi￿ed given location and scale normalizations, t =1 ,...,ﬂ T.
Proof. See Appendix C. ¥
18See,e.g.Manski (1988), Heckman (1990), Heckman and HonorØ (1989, 1990), Matzkin (1992, 1993),
Taber (2000), and Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003). A version of the strategy of this proof was ￿rst
used in psychology where agent choice sets are eliminated by experimenter manipulation. The limit set
argument eﬀectively uses regressors to reduce the choice set confronting agents. See Falmagne (1985) or
Thurstone (1959).
19We say a random variable is ￿continuous￿ if it is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure.
9Assumption (iii) is used to guarantee full rank of the model in limit sets where the probability
of events becomes arbitrarily small. In place of assumption (iv), one can work with a more
general index Ψ(t,Z (t)) to replace Z(t)γt and identify it over the relevant support, which can
be bounded if Ψ(t,Z (t)) belongs to the Matzkin class of functions presented in Appendix A.
We use this more general nonseparable model in Theorems 2 and 3 and Corollary 2, and a
fully nonseparable choice model in Section 3 below. Independence assumption (i) is strong.
A more general version of Theorem 1 can be proved using the analysis of Lewbel (2000).20
The assumptions of Theorem 1 will be satis￿ed if there are transition-speci￿ce x c l u s i o n
restrictions for Z with the required properties. In models with many periods, this may be a
demanding requirement. Very often, the Z variables are time invariant and so cannot be used
as exclusion restrictions. The following corollary tells us that the model can be identi￿ed
even if there are no conventional exclusion restrictions and the Z(t) are the same across
all time periods if suﬃcient structure is placed on how the γt vary with t. Variations in
t h ev a l u e so fγt across time periods arise naturally in ￿nite horizon dynamic discrete choice
models where a shrinking horizon produces diﬀerent eﬀects of the same variable in diﬀerent
periods. For example, in the analysis of a search model by Wolpin (1987), the value function
depends on time and the derived decision rules weight the same invariant characteristics
diﬀerently in diﬀerent periods. In a schooling model, parental background and resources
may aﬀect education continuation decisions diﬀerently at diﬀerent stages of the schooling
decision. The model generating equation (1) can be semiparametrically identi￿ed without
transition-speci￿c exclusions if the duration dependence is suﬃciently general.
Corollary 1. For the model de￿ned by equation (1), suppose in addition to the conditions
(i)￿(iv) of Theorem 1 that
(v) In condition (iii), Z(t)=Z for all t where Z is a K-dimensional random variable.
20Magnac and Maurin (2005) show how to use the Lewbel regressor to bypass identi￿cation at in￿nity
arguments. The conditions required for application of Lewbel￿s theorem and its extensions are not easily
satis￿ed. See Theorem 10 and its proof at our website, http://jenni.uchicago.edu/dyn-trmt-eﬀ,w h e r ea n
extension of Theorem 1 using the Lewbel special regressor is presented.
10Thus the same regressors are assumed to appear in all transitions. We de￿ne Z so that
the ￿rst T∗ coordinates of Z are continuous random variables (T∗ ≤ K). The support




(vi) γ1,...,γT∗,t h ec o e ﬃcients associated with the Z for the ￿rst T∗ periods of the spell,
are linearly independent. Denote the ith component of t by γi
t,( i =1 ,...,K). The
￿rst T∗ coordinates of the γt,a r en o n - z e r of o ra l lt =1 ,...,T∗.
Under these conditions, assumptions (iii) and (iv) of Theorem 1 are satis￿ed with η(i)=
−∞,ﬂ η(i)=∞. Given assumptions (i) and (ii) of Theorem 1 and assumptions (v)￿(vi) just
given, Fηt where ηt and γt,t=1 ,...,ﬂ T∗ are identi￿ed up to scale and location normalizations,
where γt =( γ1,...,γt) is to be distinguished from the ith component of γt denoted γi
t.
Proof. See Appendix C. ¥
If T∗ < ﬂ T,full identi￿cation of the model is not possible without additional information.
Observe that the number of periods where the γt are identi￿ed and joint distribution of the
η(1),...,η(t) is identi￿ed depends crucially on the number of continuous regressors. If there
are fewer continuous regressors (T∗) than time periods, (ﬂ T), the most we can identify are
the parameters γ1,...,γt and the joint distribution Fηt for t = T∗.
Conditions (v) and (vi) are suﬃcient conditions for producing measurable separability
or ￿variation freeness￿ among the indices.21 Using the Matzkin class of functions described
in Appendix B, we can extend this analysis to a general model that is nonseparable in
(Z,t) but separable in η(t). In Section 3 we prove a result analogous to Corollary 1 for a
structural model using the general representation for a more general choice function that is
fully nonseparable in all of its arguments. Theorem 1 and its Corollary provide a speci￿c
example of functions that satisfy the more general, ￿measurable separability￿ condition that
is the fundamental principle underlying identi￿cation in this class of models.22
21See Florens, Mouchart, and Rolin (1990, pp. 189￿200) for a precise de￿nition of measurable separability.
This concept clari￿es the notion of ￿variation free￿ variables.
22See Theorems 5 and 7 in Section 3.
11Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 have important consequences. The Z(t)γt, t =1 ,...,ﬂ T (or
more generally the Ψ(t,Z)) can be interpreted as duration dependence parameters that are
modi￿ed by the Z(t) and that vary across the spell in a more general way than is permitted
in mixed proportional hazards (MPH), generalized accelerated failure time (GAFT)m o d e l s
or standard discrete time hazard models.23 Duration dependence in conventional speci￿ca-
tions of duration models is usually generated by variation in model intercepts. We allow
the regressors to interact with the duration dependence parameters. The ￿heterogeneity￿
distribution Fη is identi￿ed for a general model. No special ￿permanent-transitory￿ struc-
ture is required for the unobservables although that speci￿cation is traditional in duration
analysis. Our explicit treatment of the stochastic structure of the duration model is what
allows us to link in a general way the unobservables generating the duration model to the
unobservables generating the outcome equations that are introduced in the next section.
Such an explicit link is not currently available in the literature on continuous time duration
models for treatment eﬀects, and is useful for modelling selection eﬀects in outcomes across
diﬀerent treatment times. Our outcomes can be both discrete and continuous and are not
restricted to be durations.
Under the rank condition on the γt, no period-speci￿c exclusion conditions are required
on the Z. Abbring and Van Den Berg (2003) note that period-speci￿ce x c l u s i o n sa r en o t
natural in reduced form duration models designed to approximate forward-looking life cycle
models. Agents make current decisions in light of their forecasts of future constraints and
opportunities, and if they forecast some components well, and they aﬀect current decisions,
then they are in Z (t) in period t. The rank condition of Corollary 1 and its extension in
Section 3 are of great value in establishing identi￿cation without such exclusions. We now
adjoin a system of counterfactual outcomes to our model of time to treatment to produce a
model for dynamic counterfactuals.
23See Ridder (1990) for a discussion of these models.
122.3 Reduced Form Dynamic Treatment Eﬀects
This section develops a reduced form approach to generating dynamic counterfactuals. We
apply and extend the analysis of Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003), henceforth CHH,
to generate ex post potential outcomes and their relationship with the time to treatment
indices I(t) analyzed in the preceding subsection. With reduced form models, it is diﬃcult
to impose restrictions from economic theory or to make distinctions between ex ante and ex
post outcomes. In the structural model developed in Section 3, these and other distinctions
can be made easily.
Associated with each treatment time t is a vector of outcomes Y (t,X,U (t)),t=1 ,...,ﬂ T.
Elements of this vector are outcome states associated with stopping (receiving treatment)
at the beginning of period t.F o rs t o p p i n gt i m e st0 diﬀerent from t, Y (t0,X,U(t0)),t 0 6= t,
t0 =1 ,...,ﬂ T are counterfactuals. They depend on observables, X, and unobservables, U (t),
where the observability distinction is made from the point of view of the econometrician. The
X may be t speci￿c but for the sake of notational simplicity we use the simple X notation.
The outcome variables are not necessarily what the agent thinks will happen when he or
she stops at any particular date t, but rather what actually happens. The reduced form
approach presented in this section is not suﬃciently rich to precisely capture the notion that
agents revise their anticipations of Y (t,X,U (t)),t=1 ,...,ﬂ T as they acquire information
over time. This notion is systematically developed using the structural model of Section 3.
The treatment ￿times￿ may be stages that are not necessarily connected with real times.
Thus in the analysis of section 3, ￿t￿ is a schooling level. The correspondence between
stages and times is exact if each stage takes one period to complete. Our notation is more
￿exible, and time and periods can be de￿ned more generally. Our notation in this section
accommodates both cases.
It is possible to think of Y (t,X,U(t)) as a vector of outcomes with components revealed
13at each age, a =1 ,..., ﬂ A:
Y (t,X,U (t)) =
¡





w h e r ew ed e ￿ne U (t)=( U (1,t),...,U(a,t),...,U( ﬂ A,t)).T h eX may also have age and
t speci￿cs u b v e c t o r s
¡
a =1 ,..., ﬂ A; t =1 ,...,ﬂ T
¢
. Henceforth, whenever we have random
variables with multiple arguments R0(t,Q0,...) or R1(a,t,Q0,...) where the argument list
begins with time t or both age a and time t (perhaps followed by other arguments Q0,...), we
will make use of several condensed notations: (a) dropping the ￿r s ta r g u m e n ta sw ec o l l e c t
the components into vectors R0(Q0,...) or R1(t,Q0,...) of length ﬂ T or ﬂ A, respectively,
and (b) going further in the case of R1, dropping the t argument as we collect the vectors
R1(t,Q0,...) into a single ﬂ T ￿ ﬂ A array R1(Q0,...).
This notation is suﬃciently rich to represent the life cycle of outcomes for persons who
receive treatment at t. Thus, in a schooling example, the components of this vector may
include life cycle earnings, employment, and the like associated with a person with charac-
teristics X, U (t),t=1 ,...,ﬂ T, who completes t years of schooling and then forever ceases
schooling. It could include earnings while in school at some level for persons who will even-
tually attain further schooling as well as post school earnings. Measuring a and t in the
same units, we initialize the process by assuming that t =0and a =0 .
The Y (a,t,X,U (a,t)) for a<tare outcomes realized while the person is in school at
age a (t is the time the person will leave school; a is the current age) and before ￿treatment￿
(stopping schooling) has occurred. When a ≥ t, these are post-school outcomes for treatment
with t years of schooling. In this case, a − t is years of post-school experience. In the case
o fad r u gt r i a l ,t h eY (a,t,X,U (a,t)) for a<tare measurements observed before the drug
is taken at t and if a ≥ t, they are the post-treatment measurements.
Following CHH, the variables in Y (a,t,X,U (a,t)) may include discrete, continuous or
mixed discrete-continuous components. For the discrete or mixed discrete-continuous cases,
14we assume that latent continuous variables cross thresholds to generate the discrete com-
ponents. Durations can be generated by latent index models associated with each outcome
crossing thresholds analogous to the model presented in equation (1). In this framework,
we can model the eﬀect of attaining t years of schooling on durations of unemployment or
durations of employment.
Each treatment time can have its own age path of ex post outcomes even after correcting
for selection eﬀects by controlling for observed and unobserved determinants of outcomes
apart from treatment time, and thus controlling for selection eﬀects. In addition, paths prior
to treatment may be diﬀerent for diﬀerent treatment times. Thus we can allow earnings at
age a for people who receive treatment at some future time t0 to diﬀer from earnings at
age a for people who receive treatment at some future time t00, min(t0,t 00) >aeven after
controlling for U (t) and X.24
In a model with uncertainty, agents act on and value ex ante outcomes. The model
developed in Section 3 distinguishes ex ante from ex post outcomes. The model developed in
this section cannot because, within it, it is diﬃcult to specify the information sets on which
agents act or the mechanism by which agents forecast and act on Y (t,X,U (t)) when they
are making choices.
One justi￿cation for not making an ex ante ￿ ex post distinction is that the agents being
modeled operate under perfect foresight even though econometricians do not observe all of
the information available to the agents. In this framework, the U (t),t =1 ,...,ﬂ T, are an
ingredient of the econometric model that accounts for the asymmetry of information between
the agent and the econometrician studying the agent.
Without imposing assumptions about the functional structure of the outcome equations,
we cannot nonparametrically identify counterfactual outcome states Y (t,X,U (t)) that have
never been observed. Thus, in the schooling example, we assume that we observe life cycle
24Thus we do not need to impose the ￿no anticipations￿ assumption of Abbring and Van Den Berg (2003).
However, it arises naturally in a fully speci￿ed structural model as we note in Section 3 and in Abbring and
Heckman (2006).
15outcomes for some persons for each stopping time (level of ￿nal grade completion) and our
notation re￿ects this.25 However, we do not observe Y (t,X,U (t)) for all t for anyone. A
person can have only one stopping time (one completed schooling level). This observational
limitation creates the ￿fundamental problem of causal inference.￿26
In addition to this problem, there is the standard selection problem that the Y (t,X,U (t))
are only observed for persons who stop at t and not for a random sample of the population.
The selected distribution may not accurately characterize the population distribution of
Y (t,X,U (t)) for persons selected at random. Note also that without further structure, we
can only identify treatment responses within a given policy environment. In another policy
environment where the rules governing selection into treatment and/or the outcomes from
treatment may be diﬀerent, the same time to treatment may be associated with entirely
diﬀerent responses.27 We now turn to an analysis of identi￿cation.
2.4 Identi￿cation of Outcome and Treatment Time Distributions
We assume access to data on (T,Y (T,X,U(T)),X,Z) for persons for whom T = t, X = x,
Z = z where T is the stopping time, X are the variables determining outcomes and Z
are the variables determining choices. We also assume that we know Pr(T = t | Z = z)
for t =1 ,...,ﬂ T. We assume independence of all outcomes across persons. Appendix D
presents a general analysis of identi￿cation for vector valued Y (T,X,U(T)).I n t h e t e x t ,
we consider three special cases: (a) outcomes are scalar continuous variables (e.g. present
value of earnings for a schooling example), (b) outcomes are discrete but vector valued (e.g.
employment at each age) and (c) outcomes are durations (e.g. spells of unemployment). The
￿rst case is developed further in Section 3. The third case is a discrete time analogue of
the model for counterfactual duration distributions analyzed by Abbring and Van Den Berg
25In practice we can only observe a portion of the life cycle after treatment. See the discussion on pooling
data in Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005e) to replace missing life cycle data. See Heckman and Vytlacil
(2005) for analyses of how to construct never-observed counterfactuals.
26See Holland (1986) or Gill and Robins (2001).
27This is the problem of general equilibrium eﬀects. See Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998), Heckman,
LaLonde, and Smith (1999) or Abbring and Van Den Berg (2003) for discussion of this problem.
16(2003).
We ￿rst consider the analysis of continuous outcomes. Our results generalize the analysis
of Heckman and HonorØ (1990), Heckman (1990) and CHH by considering choices generated
by a stopping time model. To simplify the notation in this section, we assume that the
scalar outcome associated with stopping at time t can be written as Y (t)=μ(t,X)+U (t),
where Y (t) is shorthand for Y (t,X,U (t)).W eo b s e r v eY (t) only if Dt−1 =( 0 ) , D(t)=1
where the D(t) are generated by a more general version of the index for time to treatment
than was used in the analysis of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1. We replace Ztγt by Ψ(t,Z)
and write I(t)=Ψ(t,Z) − η(t). We assume that the Ψ(t,Z) belong to the Matzkin class
of functions described in Appendix B. In the following, we will make use of the condensed
representations I, Ψ(Z), η, Y , μ(X) and U as described in Section 2.3.
We permit general stochastic dependence within the components of U, within the com-
ponents of η and across the two vectors. We assume that (X,Z) are independent of (U,η).
Each component of (U,η) has a zero mean. The joint distribution of (U,η) is assumed to be
absolutely continuous. Recall that we allow the X (t) to vary period by period. To simplify
notation, we simply condition on the entire vector of the X.
With ￿suﬃcient variation￿ in the components of Ψ(Z),w ec a ni d e n t i f yμ(t,X),
[Ψ(1,Z(1)),...,Ψ(t,Z (t))] and the joint distribution of U(t) and ηt. This enables us to iden-
tify average treatment eﬀects across all stopping times, since we can extract E (Y (t) − Y (t0) | X = x)
from the marginal distributions of Y (t), t =1 ,...,ﬂ T.
Theorem 2. Assume data on (Y (t),X,Z) given T = t from a random sample across per-
sons. We also observe (T,Z) from a random sample and we assume that the T are not
censored. Write ηt =( η(1),...,η(t)) and Ψt(Z)=( Ψ(1,Z(1)),...,Ψ(t,Z (t))).T h eΨt (Z)
are elements of the Matzkin class of functions. Assume that
(i) (U(t),η t) are continuous random variables with zero means, ￿nite variances and with





respectively, t =1 ,...,ﬂ T. These conditions hold for each component of each subvector.
17The joint system is thus measurably separable for each component with respect to every
other component.
(ii) (U(t),η t) ⊥ ⊥ (X,Z), t =1 ,...,ﬂ T (independence).
(iii) Supp(μ(t,X),Ψt (Z)) = Supp(μ(t,X)) ￿
t Q
j=1
Supp(Ψ(j,Z (j))), t =1 ,...,ﬂ T.
(iv) Supp(Ψt (Z)) ⊇ Supp(ηt)
Then we can identify μ(t,X),Ψt (Z),F ηt,U(t),t=1 ,...,ﬂ T, up to scale if the Matzkin class
is speci￿ed up to scale, and are exactly identi￿ed if a speci￿c normalization is used.
Proof. From data on Y (t), X and Z for D(t)=1 , Dt−1 =( 0 ) , and from data on stopping
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fU(t),ηt (u,η(1),...,η(t)) dη(1)•••dη(t)du. (2)
D(0) = 0 is ￿xed exogenously outside of the model.
Under assumption (iv),f o ra l lx ∈ Supp(X) we can vary the values of Z and obtain
a limit set Z such that lim
Z→Z
Pr(D(t)=1 ,D t−1 =( 0 )| X = x,Z = z)=1 .T h u s w e c a n
identify the distribution of U (t), t =1 ,...,ﬂ T, free of selection bias. From this argument, we
can identify the μ(t,X). (We recover the intercepts through the assumption E (U(t)) = 0.)
Condition (iv) allows us to generalize Theorem 1 by allowing for a more general speci￿cation
of the index functions belonging to the Matzkin class. Using her analysis we can recover
the Ψ(t,Z). From knowledge of y(t) and μ(t,X), Ψt(Z), and from condition (iii),w ec a n
vary y(t) − μ(t,X), Ψt(Z) freely and trace out the joint distribution of (U (t),η t). Under
18the assumptions of the theorem, we can do this for all t =1 ,...,ﬂ T.I fw eu s et h eM a t z k i n
conditions for functions up to scale, we identify the Ψt (Z) up to scale and the distributions
of the unobservables up to scale Fηt,U(t),t=1 ,...,ﬂ T. ¥
Theorem 2 does not identify the joint distribution of Y (1),...,Y
¡ﬂ T
¢
b e c a u s ew eo b -
serve only one of these outcomes for any person. Observe that we do not require exclusion
restrictions in the arguments of the choice of treatment equation to identify the counter-
factuals. We require independent variation of arguments (￿measurable separability￿) which
might be achieved by exclusion conditions but can be obtained by other functional restric-
tions as in the proof of Corollary 1. Observe further that we can identify the μ(t,X) (up to
constants) without the limit set argument. From the expression for (2), for each ￿xed Z = z
and Pr(D(t)=1 ,D t−1 =( 0 )| X = x,Z = z)=p,w ec a nv a r yy(t) and trace out μ(t,X)
within each p set (see Heckman, 1990; Heckman and Smith, 1998, and CHH). Thus we can
identify certain features of the model without using the limit set argument.
The proof of Theorem 2 can easily be extended to cover the case of vector Y (t,X,U (t))
where each component is a continuous random variable. See Theorem D.1 in Appendix D.
There we allow for age-speci￿co u t c o m e sY (a,t,X,U (a,t)),a=1 ,..., ﬂ A where Y can be a
vector of outcomes. In particular, we can identify age-speci￿ce a r n i n g s￿ows associated with
multiple sources of income. We use this result in Section 3 of this paper.
As a by-product of Theorem 2, we can construct the distributions of Y (t) for a variety
of counterfactual histories leading up to t.D e ￿ne a process based on the index crossing
property for I (t) without any requirement on the positivity or negativity of I (t − j), j>0.
Let B(t)=1[I(t) ≥ 0] where B(t) ∈ {0,1}.L e tBt =( B(1),...,B(t)) where bt is de￿ned
as the vector of possible values of B (t). D(t) was de￿ned as B(t) given Dt =( 0 ) . B (t) is
de￿ned without this restriction.
With the B(t) it is possible to contemplate many alternative histories ruled out in the
19construction of D(t). From Theorem 2, we can construct
Pr
¡
Y (t) ≤ y(t) | B
t = b
t,X= x,Z = z
¢
for all of the 2t possible sequences of Bt outcomes up to t including sequences that were ruled
out in the de￿nition of the model for D(t) in equation (1) such as bt =( 0 ,1,0,1,...). We
obtain these probabilities by reversing the Ψ(t,Z) limits associated with the η(1),...,η(t)
arguments of equation (2).28
These counterfactuals are diﬃc u l tt oi n t e r p r e ti fw et a k es t o p p i n gt i m em o d e l( 1 )l i t e r -
ally. They allow for the possibility of persons starting and stopping treatment on multiple
occasions leading up to t. We can also identify the distribution of Y (t) for persons who stop
at some time after t (T>t ).29 There are two ways to interpret these features of our model:
(a) as a symptom of incomplete speci￿cation of the statistical model because it allows for
reentry even though the economic model does not; or (b) as a desirable feature because it
allows for richer speci￿cations of the economic model that permit reentry.
Note further that the counterfactuals that are identi￿ed by ￿xing diﬀerent D(j) at diﬀer-
ent values have an asymmetric aspect. We can generate Y (t) distributions for persons who
are treated at t or before. Without further structure, we cannot generate the distributions
of these random variables for people who receive treatment at times after t.
The source of this asymmetry is the generality of duration model (1). At each stopping
time t, we acquire a new random variable η(t) which can have arbitrary dependence with
Y (t) and Y (t0) for all t and t0. From Theorem 2, we can identify this dependence between
η(t) and Y (t0) if t0 ≤ t. We cannot identify the dependence between η(t) and Y (t0) for
t0 >twithout imposing further structure on the unobservables.30.T h u sw ec a ni d e n t i f yt h e
distribution of college outcomes for high school graduates who do not go on to college and
28Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005d) develop a semiparametric ordered choice model with stochastic
thresholds that rules out these extraneous sequences but at the price of eliminating option values from the
dynamic discrete choice model.
29This is the event associated with Bt =( 0 ) .
30One possible structure is a factor model which we apply to this problem in the next section.
20can compare these to outcomes for high school graduates, so we can identify the parameter
￿treatment on the untreated.￿ However, we cannot identify the distribution of high school
outcomes for college graduates (e.g. treatment on the treated parameters) without imposing
further structure.31 Since we can identify the marginal distributions under the conditions of
Theorem 2, we can identify pairwise average treatment eﬀects for all t,t0.
Appendix C contrasts the model identi￿ed by Theorem 2 with a conventional static
multinomial discrete choice model with an associated system of counterfactuals. In that Ap-
pendix, we prove semiparametric identi￿cation of the conventional static model of discrete
choice joined with counterfactuals and show how to identify all of the standard counterfactu-
als. For that model there is a ￿xed set of unobservables governing all stopping times. Thus
we do not acquire new unobservables associated with each stopping time. With suitable
normalizations, we can identify the joint distributions of choices and associated outcomes
without the diﬃculties, just noted, that appear in the reduced form dynamic model.
A Model for Discrete Outcome Counterfactuals
We next develop a discrete outcome analog to the results just presented for continuous
outcomes. In this subsection, we suppose that associated with each stopping time at age a is
a binary variable e(a,t,X), denoting, for example, employment at age a for a person with
stopping time (treatment time) T = t with regressors X.F o r s p e c i ￿city, in the schooling
example, treatment time t is the age at which a person drops out of school. We assume that
e(a,t,X)=1[e∗ (a,t,X) ≥ 0],t=1 ,...,ﬂ T, a=1 ,..., ﬂ A where e∗ (a,t,X)=μe (a,t,X) −
Ue (a,t) and each Ue(a,t) has zero mean and ￿nite variance. In the schooling example
we can think of the e(a,t,X) as employment indicators before schooling is ￿nished and
after, for people who have exactly t years of schooling. In the following, we will make use
of the condensed forms e(t,X), e(X), e∗ (t,X), e∗ (X), μe (t,X), μe (X), Ue(t) and Ue as





=1 . Thus at stage ﬂ T − 1, we can identify the distribution of Y
¡ﬂ T − 1
¢
for persons for
whom D(0) = 0,...,D





=1 . Hence if college is the terminal state and high school the
state preceding college, we can identify the distribution of high school outcomes for college graduates.
21described in Section 2.3. We assume Ue (t) ⊥ ⊥ X,Z.T h ee(t,x) are factuals for T = t and
counterfactuals for stopping times other than t. Instead of analyzing only the outcome at t,
we analyze the entire path of outcomes associated with stopping time t.
Ignoring the selection problem, identi￿cation of μe (X) (up to scale) is a standard ap-
plication of known results in the semiparametric discrete choice literature. The scales are
arbitrary because the inequality that generates e(a,t,X) remains valid if the arguments are
scaled by any positive constant. Let Ψt(Z)=( Ψ(1,Z(1),...,Ψ(t,Z(t)) and recall that
ηt =( η(1),...,η(t)).W ep r o v et h ef o l l o w i n gt h e o r e m .
Theorem 3. Assume data on e(t,X),X,Z given T = t. Assume data on stopping times T
and Z from a random sample across observations and that the T are not censored. Further
assume that Ψt (Z) and μe (t,X) are members of the Matzkin class of functions and that
(i) (Ue(t),ηt) are continuous random variables with zero means, ￿nite variances and with







respectively. These conditions hold for each subcomponent of each subvector. The joint
system is thus measurably separable for each component with respect to every other
component.
(ii) (Ue(t),ηt) ⊥ ⊥ (X,Z), t =1 ,...,ﬂ T,
(iii) Supp(μe (t,X),Ψt (Z)) = Supp(μe (t,X)) ￿
t Q
j=1
Supp(Ψ(j,Z (j))), t =1 ,...,ﬂ T,a n d
this holds for each component of each vector,




Supp(η(j)), t =1 ,...,ﬂ T, and this holds for each
c o m p o n e n to fe a c hv e c t o r ,
Then we can identify Ψt (Z), μe (t,X) and the joint distributions of (Ue(t),ηt) under the
Matzkin conditions applied to each component of μe (a,t,X), Ue(a,t) a n dt oe a c hc o m p o n e n t
22of Ψt (Z) and the corresponding component of ηt. Applying the Matzkin conditions for the
functions and random variables up to scale, we obtain the functions and the distributions of
the random variables up to scale.
Proof. The proof for this case parallels that of Theorem 2 with two exceptions. Since we do
not observe e∗ (t,X), but just its dichotomization, we cannot use its variation to trace out
the distribution of Ue (t), as we did with y(t) in Theorem 2 to produce the desired variation
with condition (iv) of Theorem 3. To substitute for this variation, we invoke condition (iv).
See Appendix D for the proof for the general case. We analyze the entire lifecycle path of
the e(a,t,X) instead of just the period t outcome. ¥
In this setup, we can analyze strings of binary outcome sequences associated with each
treatment time. Theorem 3 can be modi￿ed to cover the case of counterfactual durations
and we sketch this extension in Corollary 2 below. Note that Theorem 3 is more general
than Theorem 2 in the sense that we identify the model generating vector e(t,X) and not
just a scalar outcome like Y (t). Theorem D.1 in Appendix D extends Theorems 2 and 3
to consider both cases and a vector version of Y (t), as well as an associated measurement
system.
To produce a result on semiparametric identi￿cation of a discrete time analogue of the
Abbring and Van Den Berg (2003) model of counterfactuals for durations, we assemble
ingredients from Theorems 1, 2 and 3. Let ∆(a,t,X) be an indicator of whether a person
at age a,t r e a t m e n tt i m et and characteristics X is in a spell of the outcome being studied
(e.g. of employment or unemployment). Individuals receive at most one treatment. Assume
that ∆(0,t,X)=0for all t>0.Ap e r s o ns t a r t i n gi n￿ 0￿ exits to ￿1￿. We normalize the
initial age to zero so the scales for measuring age and time of treatment are the same. The
age where ∆ ￿rst becomes 1 is the length of the initial spell and the treatment time is t.32
Let ∆∗ (a,t,X)=χ(a,t,X) − ν (a,t) denote a latent variable where ν (a,t) has a zero
mean and ￿nite variance and ν (a,t) ⊥ ⊥ (X,Z) for all a,t. W eu s et h ec o n d e n s e df o r m
32Recall that exit events in period t occur instantaneously at the beginning of the period.











.W ed e ￿ne the indicator of remaining in the initial
state at age a for treatment time t as
∆(a,t,X)=1[∆
∗ (a,t,X) ≥ 0] for ∆
a−1 (X)=( 0 )
where ∆a−1 (X) is the history of the process up through age a − 1. To parallel the analysis
of Abbring and Van Den Berg (2003), we consider ￿ow sampling of new spells. Thus in an
analysis of unemployment, individuals start unemployed and are unemployed at least through
treatment, are treated at age a0 (or time t = a0) ,a n dt h e na r ef o l l o w e da f t e rt r e a t m e n ta t
least until they leave the initial state. Treatment time (or age) a0 is the age in the spell at
which training is administered.
Implicit in the treatment time decision rule is the requirement that an individual be
in the starting state (0) in order to receive treatment. Thus for T = t,i ti sr e q u i r e d
that ∆(a,t,X)=0for all a ≤ t. Treatment is assumed to be instantaneous but under
a nonanticipation assumption any eﬀects of treatment are found in periods a>t .We can
prove the following Corollary of Theorem 3.
Corollary 2. Assume data on ∆(t,X),X,Z given T = t.A s s u m ed a t ao ns t o p p i n gt i m e s
T and Z from an initial random sample of persons in the state ￿0￿. Further assume that
Ψt (Z) and χ(t,X) are members of the Matzkin class of functions and that
(i) (ν(t),ηt) are continuous random variables with zero means, ￿nite variances and support




for all t =1 ,...,ﬂ T. These conditions hold for each subcomponent of each subvector.
The joint system is thus measurably separable for each component with respect to every
other component.
(ii) (ν(t),ηt) ⊥ ⊥ (X,Z),f o ra l lt =1 ,...,ﬂ T.
24(iii) Supp(χ(t,X),Ψt (Z)) = Supp(χ(t,X)) ￿
t Q
 =1
Supp(Ψ( ,Z( )), for all t =1 ,...,ﬂ T,
and this holds for each component of each vector.
(iv) Supp(χ(t,X),Ψt (Z)) ⊇ Supp(ν(t),ηt),f o ra l lt =1 ,...,ﬂ T.
(v) Supp(ν(t),η t)=Supp(ν (t)) ￿
t Q
 =1
Supp(η( )), for all t =1 ,...,ﬂ T, and this holds for
each component.
Then, under the Matzkin conditions, we can identify Ψt (Z) and χ(t,X) and the joint dis-
tributions of (ν (t),η t) for t =1 ,...,ﬂ T. If we weaken these conditions so that the class of the
functions is only known up to scale, we identify these functions up to scale and distributions
of the random variables up to scale.
Proof. The proof uses the ingredients of Theorem 3 and for the sake of brevity is deleted.
¥
The basic idea underlying the proof is that with suﬃcient variation in (X,Z),w ec a n
identify subsets of persons who survive in the initial state of unemployment untreated to any
given age a with a high probability. Some of the previously untreated survivors are treated
at a and followed at least until they leave ￿0￿. The model is intrinsically complex, requiring
that the analyst correct for selection into various pre-treatment survivorship statuses. The
analyst must also correct for the eﬀect of survival up to a on the possibility of treatment
at a. We do not develop the full model of treatment times for the reduced form duration
analysis in this paper.33
Theorem 3 and Corollary 2 reverse the order of the B-D conditioning discussion presented
in the previous subsection. Both exploit the properties of index models. The duration models
for time to treatment or for time to exiting unemployment place restrictions on the order in
which thresholds are permitted to cross zero and their dependence on survival times.
In the reduced form models for Y (t),e(a,t) or ∆(a,t), the pre-treatment outcomes
at each age can diﬀer depending on the time of treatment even after controlling for the
33The model of treatment times in Abbring and Van Den Berg is also implicit.
25X,t h eZt, the U (t) and the ηt. T h u sw ed on o th a v et oi m p o s et h e￿ n oa n t i c i p a t i o n s ￿
assumption invoked by Abbring and Van Den Berg (2003) which requires that controlling
for the variables in their model analogous to our X,Zt,ηt and U (t),t h ea g ea outcomes
(a<t ) be the same for all treatment times after a. This requirement rules out that the
future can cause the past and is an intuitive requirement of a causal model.34 As we discuss
in Section 3, this is an artifact of the incompleteness of the speci￿cation of reduced form
models. This possibility arises because the framework in this section, like the framework of
many reduced form models, is not suﬃciently rich to model or identify the information sets
of agents. Conditioning on the same information set, the outcomes at pretreatment age a
(a<t ) are the same for persons with diﬀerent treatment times as we show in the structural
models of Section 3.35
The models for binary strings and durations also share the property with the model
produced by Theorem 2 that counterfactuals for impossible strings of treatment time histories
can be generated. This is a consequence of the index function structure. Recall our discussion
of the B-D conditioning in the preceding subsection.
We now turn to the development of factor models that allow us to construct the joint
distributions of outcomes across stopping times.
2.5 Using Factor Models to Identify Joint Distributions of Coun-
terfactuals
From Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 or their generalization, Theorem D.1 in Appendix D,
we can identify joint distributions of outcomes for each treatment time t and the index
34The requirement is imposed by requiring either that Y (a,t)=Y (a,t0)[ e(a,t)=e(a,t0);∆(a,t)=
∆(a,t0)] for all min(t0,t) >a , or the weaker requirement that the pretreatment distributions be the
same. We note that in quantum electrodynamics, Feynman￿s equations explicitly predict that the fu-
ture causes the past so a ￿common sense￿ notion of causality is violated in this branch of physics. See
www.qedcorp.com/pcr/pcr/m13.html.
35In a perfectly certain environment, the ￿no anticipations￿ condition is meaningless since the treatment
time is in the agent￿s information set and it is not possible to standardize information sets across people
with diﬀerent treatment times.
26generating treatment times. We cannot identify the joint distributions of outcomes across
treatment times. As a consequence, we cannot, in general, identify treatment on the treated
parameters.36
Aakvik, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2005) and CHH show how to use factor models to identify
the joint distributions across treatment times and recover the standard treatment parameters.
We can use their approach to identify the joint distribution of Y =( Y (1),...,Y(ﬂ T)).
The basic idea underlying this approach is to use distributions for outcomes measured
at each treatment time t and on the choice index to construct the joint distribution of out-
comes across treatment choices. To illustrate how the idea works, suppose that we augment
Theorem 2 by appealing to Theorem D.1 in Appendix D to identify the joint distribution
o ft h ev e c t o ro fo u t c o m e sa te a c hs t o p p i n gt i m ea l o n gw i t hIt =( I (1),...,I(t)) for each t.
For each t,w em a yw r i t e
Y (a,t,X,U (a,t)) = μ(a,t,X)+U (a,t) a =1 ,..., ﬂ A
I(t)=Ψ(t,Z)+η(t).
From the Matzkin conditions, the scale is determined. If we specify the Matzkin func-
tions only up to scale, we determine the functions up to scale and make a normalization.
From Theorem 2 and Theorem D.1, we can identify the joint distribution of (η(1),...,η(t),
U(1,t),...,U( ﬂ A,t)).
Suppose that we adopt a one factor model where θ is the factor. It has mean zero and
we can represent the errors by
η(t)=ϕtθ + εη(t)
U (a,t)=αa,tθ + εa,t,a =1 ,..., ﬂ A, t =1 ,...,ﬂ T.
The θ are independent of all of the εη(t), εa,t and the ε￿s are mutually independent mean
36In the schooling model, we can identify these parameters at terminal treatment time ﬂ T.
27zero disturbances. The ϕt and αa,t are called factor loadings. Since θ is an unobservable, its
scale is unknown. We can set the scale of θ by normalizing one factor loading, say α ﬂ A, ﬂ T =1 .
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θ.
For ﬂ A ≥ 3, we can identify σ2
θ, αa,t,ϕ t,a=1 ,..., ﬂ A for t =1 ,...,ﬂ T.37 From this information






even though we do not observe outcomes for the same person at two diﬀerent stopping times.
Thus we can construct the joint distribution of (U,η)=( U (1),...,U
¡ﬂ T
¢
,η).F r o m t h i s
joint distribution we can recover the standard mean treatment eﬀects as well as the joint
distributions of the potential outcomes. We can determine the percentage of participants
at treatment time t who bene￿t from participation compared to what their outcomes would
be at other treatment times. We can perform a parallel analysis for the index functions
e∗(a,t,X) used to generate e(a,t,X) in Section 2.4 as well as for the ∆∗ (a,t,X).C o n -
ventional factor analysis assumes that the unobservables are normally distributed. CHH
establish nonparametric identi￿ability of the θ￿s and the ε￿s and their analysis of nonpara-
metric identi￿ability applies here.
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= αa0, ﬂ Tσ2
θ
S i n c ew ek n o wαa0, ﬂ T, we can identify σ2
θ.W ec a ni d e n t i f yϕt,t=1 ,...,ﬂ T from
Cov(U (a,t),η(t)) = αa,tϕtσ2
θ.
¥
28In the schooling example discussed in the previous subsection, having access to these
distributions means that we can form not only the potential earnings in college of a high
school graduate as we could without invoking the factor structure assumption, but we are also
able to generate the distribution of potential earnings in high school of a college graduate.
Thus, in addition to the pairwise average treatment eﬀects that can be formed using the
output of Theorem 2, we can form treatment on the treated, as well as all of the distributional
treatment eﬀects discussed in CHH, Heckman and Smith (1998) and Heckman and Vytlacil
(2006a). As noted by CHH and Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005a,b,c,e), we can also
form the joint distribution of college and high school earnings for college graduates.
Theorem 2, strictly applied, actually produces only one scalar outcome for each stopping
time. We need three or more measurements for each stopping time to use factor analysis.
Theorem D.1 in Appendix D extends the analysis of Theorem 2 to a vector outcome case.
If vector outcomes are not available, access to a measurement system M that assumes the
same values for each stopping time can substitute for the need for vector outcomes for Y .
Let Mj be the jth component of this measurement system. Write
Mj = μj,M(X)+Uj,M,j =1 ,...,J,
where Uj,M are mean zero and independent of X.
Suppose that the Uj,M have a one-factor structure so Uj,M = αj,Mθ + εj,M,j=1 ,...,J,
where the εj,M are mean zero, mutually independent random variables, independent of the
θ. Adjoining these measurements to the one outcome measure Y (t) with a factor structure
joined with two or more measurements (J ≥ 2) can substitute for the measurements of
Y (a,t) used in the previous example. In an analysis of schooling, the Mj can be test scores
that depend on ability θ. Ability is assumed to aﬀect outcomes Y (t) and the choice of
treatment times indices arrayed in I.
These examples illustrate the wealth of counterfactual within￿and across￿stopping time
29t distributions that can be produced from the factor models developed in Aakvik, Heckman,
and Vytlacil (2005) and in CHH. The factor models are convenient vehicles for generating
low-dimensional representations of unobservables. Alternative methods for generating low
dimensional representations of unobservables that can be used to construct counterfactual
distributions across treatment times are pursued in Urzua (2005).
Factor models generalize the method of matching. Conditional on θ,X,Z, all of the
potential outcomes are independent of D(l): Y (t) ⊥ ⊥ D(l) | X,Z,θ for all t,l =1 ,...,ﬂ T.
Our analysis allows for the possibility that θ is unobserved by the economist. The price of
a l l o w i n gf o rt h i si sa s s u m i n gt h a tθ ⊥ ⊥ (X,Z). This assumption is not required in matching,
if we observe the θ.38
A limitation of the reduced form approach pursued in this section is that, because the
underlying model of choice is not clearly speci￿ed, it is not possible without further structure
to form, or even de￿ne, the marginal treatment eﬀect analyzed in Heckman and Vytlacil
(1999, 2001, 2005, 2006a,b) or Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2005). The absence of well
de￿ned choice equations is problematic for the model we have analyzed thus far, although
it is typical of many statistical treatment eﬀect analyses.39,40 In this framework, it is not
possible to distinguish objective outcomes from subjective evaluations of outcomes, and to
distinguish ex ante from ex post outcomes. It is also possible to identify counterfactuals that
can depend on future treatment times, contrary to intuitions that the future cannot cause
the past. We can rule out such models by assumption as is the practice in the statistical
treatment eﬀect literature (see e.g. Robins, 1997; Gill and Robins, 2001; Lok, 2001) but the
assumptions on the underlying economic model required to do this are not clearly articulated
38Conditioning on observables to produce conditional independence models between counterfactuals and
assignment is discussed in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), Gill and Robins (2001), Lechner and Miquel (2002),
Heckman and Navarro (2004), and CHH.
39Heckman (2006) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2006a,b) point out that one distinctive feature of the
economic approach to program evaluation is the use of choice theory to de￿ne parameters and evaluate
alternative estimators.
40This contrasts with the semiparametric model for treatment eﬀects in a multinomial choice model in
Appendix B, where a well de￿ned choice criterion exists. This appendix de￿nes EOTM,t h ee ﬀect of treatment
for people at the margin, for a classical multinomial choice model with associated outcomes. See also CHH.
30in the reduced form approach.
We now develop an explicit economic model for dynamic treatment eﬀects that allows
us to make these and other distinctions and to eliminate hard-to-interpret features of the
statistical model. We extend the analysis presented in this section to a more precisely
formulated economic model. We explicitly allow for agent updating of information sets. A
well posed economic model rules out the possibility that the future causes the past as part
of the model speci￿cation. It also enables us to evaluate policies in one environment and
accurately project them to new environments as well as accurately forecast new policies never
previously experienced. See Heckman (2006) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2005, 2006a,b).
3 A Sequential Structural Model with Option Values
This section analyzes the identi￿ability of a structural sequential optimal stopping time
model. We use ingredients assembled in the previous sections to build an economically
interpretable framework for analyzing dynamic treatment eﬀects. We focus on a schooling
model with associated earnings outcomes that is motivated by the work of Keane and Wolpin
(1997) and Eckstein and Wolpin (1999). We explicitly model costs and allow for work while
in school. We allow for the arrival of serially correlated shocks in information more general
than those entertained by Pakes (1986), Rust (1987), Hotz and Miller (1993), Manski (1993),
Keane and Wolpin (1997) or Eckstein and Wolpin (1999).
In the model of this section it is possible to interpret the literature on dynamic treatment
eﬀects within the context of an economic model; to allow for earnings while in school as well
as grade-speci￿c tuition costs; to separately identify returns and costs; to distinguish private
evaluations from ￿objective￿ ex ante and ex post outcomes and to identify persons at various
margins of choice. In the context of medical economics, we consider how to identify the pain
and suﬀering associated with a treatment as well as the distribution of bene￿ts from the
intervention. We also model how anticipations about potential future outcomes associated
31with various choices evolve over the life cycle as sequential treatment choices are made.
In contrast to the analysis of Section 2, the identi￿cation proof for our dynamic choice
model works in reverse starting from the last period and sequentially proceeding backward.
This approach is required by the forward-looking nature of dynamic choice analysis and
makes an interesting contrast with our reduced form analyses which proceed forward from
initial period values.
We use limit set arguments to identify the parameters of outcome and measurement
systems for each stopping time t =1 ,...,ﬂ T, including means and joint distributions of un-
observables. These systems are identi￿ed without invoking any special assumptions about
the structure of model unobservables. If we invoke factor structure assumptions for the un-
observables, we identify the factor loadings associated with the measurements (as de￿ned
in Section 2.5) and outcomes. We also nonparametrically identify the distributions of the
factors and the distributions of the innovations to the factors. With the joint distributions
of outcomes and measurements in hand for each treatment time, we can identify cost (and
preference) information from choice equations that depend on outcomes and costs (prefer-
ences). We can also identify joint distributions of outcomes across stopping times. Thus we
can identify the proportion of people who bene￿t from treatment. Our analysis generalizes
the one shot decision models of Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005a,b,c,e) to a sequential
setting.
Because our model makes many new distinctions that are not possible in the analysis of
Section 2, we have to introduce some new notation. Agents make decisions about schooling
at each age in their life cycle, and we are explicit about their decision rule.
Agents sequentially select schooling levels. New information arrives at each stage. One
of the bene￿ts of continuing on in a process is the arrival of new information. Let t(a) ∈
{1,...,ﬂ T} index the schooling level that an individual has attained at age a ∈ {1,..., ﬂ A}.
The person may go on to attain more years of schooling. Each year of schooling takes one
year of age to complete. We assume that there is no grade repetition and we assume that
32once persons stop schooling, they never return. It would be better to derive such stopping
behavior as a feature of a more general model with possible recurrence of states but we do
not do so here.41
As a consequence of these assumptions, t(a)=a up to the time the person drops out
of school. Aging continues but schooling does not. We set D(a)=0if the individual
decides to continue to the next level of schooling (i.e., does not receive ￿treatment￿ at age
a)a n dD(a)=1if the individual stops at a. In our notation, ￿nal schooling level (time
at treatment) T = t(a) is the ￿rst age a (grade t(a))a tw h i c hD(a)=1 .E q u i v a l e n t l y ,
we could denote this event by D(t(a)) = 1, because up to the time of dropout from the





to be an indicator of whether the individual stopped (received
treatment) by age a (so δ(a)=1 ) or whether the individual is still a student entering age a
(so δ(a)=0 ).42 Figure 1 shows the evolution of age and grades, and clari￿es the notation.
Let individual earnings at age a for a person with current schooling level t(a) be written
as
Y (a,t(a),δ(a),X)=μ(a,t(a),δ(a),X)+U (a,t(a),δ(a)), (3)
so Y (a,t(a),0,X) denotes the earnings of an individual with characteristics X who is still
enrolled in school and goes on to complete at least t(a)+1 years of schooling. U (a,t(a),δ(a))
is a mean zero shock that is unobserved by the econometrician but may, or may not, be
observed by the agent. It is the earnings of the person as a student at age a. Y (a,t(a),1,X)
denotes the earnings at age a of an agent who has decided to stop schooling at or before
age a.W h e n δ(a)=1 , Y (a,t(a),δ(a),X) is meaningfully de￿ned only if a ≥ t(a).W e
impose this restriction throughout, and de￿ne all counterfactuals invoking this assumption
to produce interpretable models.
41See Heckman, Urzua, and Yates (2005) for the derivation identi￿cation and estimation of such a model.
42Recall that treatment is instantaneous and occurs at the start of the period.
33T h ed i r e c tc o s to fr e m a i n i n ge n r o l l e di ns c h o o la ta g ea is
C (t(a),X,Z(t(a))) = Φ(t(a),X,Z(t(a))) + W (t(a))
where X and Z (t(a)) are vectors of observed characteristics (from the point of view of the
econometrician) that aﬀect costs at schooling level t(a),a n dW(t(a)) are mean zero shocks
that are unobserved by the econometrician that may or may not be observed by the agent.
Costs are paid in the period before schooling is undertaken. The agent is assumed to know
the costs of making schooling decisions at each transition. The agent is also assumed to
know the X and the Z(t(a)) for all periods.43
Once an agent decides to stop at schooling level T = t, she never returns to school. Under
these assumptions, the expected reward at age a of stopping (i.e., receiving treatment) at
T = t is given by the expected present value of her remaining lifetime earnings:
R(a,t,X)=E






Y (a + j,t,1,X)




where Ia is the age-speci￿c information set which includes the schooling level attained at age
a as well as all state variables known to the agent including conditional distributions of future
variables that are forecast by the agent. A more accurate notation would write R(a,t,Ia)
but it is convenient in the proofs to use R(a,t,X) and we do so in this paper. We assume a
￿xed, nonstochastic, interest rate r.44 Because agents are forward looking, we de￿ne the cost
shifters for schooling levels t(a) and beyond as Zt(a) =
¡
Z (t(a)),Z(t(a)+1 ),...,Z
¡ﬂ T − 1
¢¢
,
and de￿ne the entire vector of cost shifters as Z = Z1. Agents are assumed to know these
cost shifters and they are in the information set Ia.T h e c o n t i n u a t i o n v a l u e a t a g e a and
schooling level t(a) given X and Zt(a) is denoted K (a,t(a),Ia).
At ﬂ T −1, when an individual decides whether to stop or continue on to ﬂ T, the expected
43These assumptions can be relaxed and are made for convenience. See Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro
(2005e) for a discussion of selecting variables in the agent￿s information set.
44This assumption can be relaxed but we do not do so in this paper.
34reward from remaining enrolled and continuing to ﬂ T (i.e., the continuation value) is the
earnings while in school less costs plus the expected discounted future return that arises
from completing ﬂ T years of schooling:
K
¡ﬂ T − 1, ﬂ T − 1,Iﬂ T−1
¢
= Y
¡ﬂ T − 1, ﬂ T − 1,0,X
¢
− C
¡ﬂ T − 1,X,Z













¡ﬂ T − 1,X,Z
¡ﬂ T − 1
¢¢
is the direct cost of schooling for the transition to ﬂ T.T h i se x -
pression embodies our assumption that each year of school takes one year of age. Iﬂ T−1incorporates
all of the information known to the agent.
The value function at ﬂ T − 1 is the larger of the two expected rewards that arise from
stopping at ﬂ T − 1 or continuing one more period to ﬂ T:
V
¡





¡ﬂ T − 1, ﬂ T − 1,X
¢
,K
¡ﬂ T − 1, ﬂ T − 1,Iﬂ T−1
¢“
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The option value at age a of continuing schooling further than t(a) is given by the diﬀerence
b e t w e e nt h er e w a r da ni n d i v i d u a le x p e c t st oo b t a i nb yg o i n gt oo n em o r ey e a ro fs c h o o l ,
taking into consideration that he might go even further, and the reward he expects to obtain
35by stopping the next year,
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R(a +1 ,t(a)+1 ,X) |I t(a)
¢
.45
In the notation for index functions introduced in Section 2, we de￿ne the decision rule







> 0,I (a − 1,t(a) − 1,It(a)−1) ≤ 0,...,I(1,1,I1) ≤ 0
⁄
.
For proving identi￿c a t i o n ,i ti su s e f u lt os e p a r a t eo u tt h ec o m p o n e n to ft h ec o s tf u n c t i o n
based on observables (from the point of view of the econometrician), Φ(t(a),X,Z(t(a))),
45Our model allows no recall and is clearly a simpli￿cation of a more general model of schooling with
option values. Instead of imposing the requirement that once a student drops out the student never returns,
it would be useful to derive this property as a feature of the economic environment and the characteristics of
individuals. In a more general model, diﬀerent persons could drop out and return to school at diﬀerent times
as information sets are revised. This would create further option value beyond the option value developed in
the text that arises from the possibility that persons who attain a given schooling level can attend the next
schooling level in any future period. Implicit in our analysis of option values is the additional assumption
that persons must work at the highest level of education for which they are trained. An alternative model
allows individuals to work each period at the highest wage across all levels of schooling that they have
attained. Such a model may be too extreme because it ignores the costs of switching jobs, especially at the
higher educational levels where there may be a lot of job-speci￿c human capital for each schooling level. A
model with these additional features is presented in Heckman, Urzua, and Yates (2005).
36from the rest of the index which include the unobservable W (t(a)) as well as other ingredi-




























where Υ(t(a),X,Zt(a)+1) is the ￿error term￿ of the index function generating the model.
We use the notation Υ
¡
t(a),X,Zt(a)+1¢
because it is helpful to understand the argument





where It(a) is the information set of the agent at stage t(a) which may include
Zt(a) and X.
An individual stops at the schooling level at the ￿rst age where this index becomes
positive.46 From data on stopping times, we can nonparametrically identify the conditional
probability of stopping at a,
Pr(T = t(a) | X,Z)=P r
⎛









a − 1,t(a) − 1,It(a)−1
¢
≤ 0,...,
I (1,t(1),I1) ≤ 0
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
X = x,Z = z
⎞
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
,
where a = t(a) until the age where a person stops schooling, and δ(a)=1 .
In order to identify the sequential revelation of information and to identify the cost
functions, we represent the unobservables (from the point of view of the econometrician)
46This makes implicit assumptions about the economic environment facing agents. Stationarity of the
environment would produce this outcome but it is only a suﬃcient condition. We leave development of more
precise conditions for later work.
37using a factor structure tailored to the notation of this section,
U (a,t(a),δ(a)) = θαa,t(a),δ(a) + ε(a,t(a),δ(a))




a =1 ,..., ﬂ A, t(a) ≤ a for δ(a)=1 ,
where the subscript on the factor loading is the argument of the variable being given a
factor representation. We assume that the measurement equations (the M of Section 2.5)
can also be factor analyzed using θ,a nL-dimensional vector of factors (θ1,...,θ L) and that
Uj,M = θαj,M + εj,M, j =1 ,...,J. We also assume that the ε and ξ have zero means and
￿nite variances and are component-wise independent and independent of the θ which are
also component-wise independent: θi ⊥ ⊥ θj,f o ra l li 6= j, i,j =1 ,...,L.47
The agent is assumed to make choices using rational expectations. By this we mean that
the agent whose choice behavior is being analyzed knows the distributions of θ, {ε(a, t(a),
δ(a))}
ﬂ A
a=1,ξ(t(a)) for all a and t(a)=a,...,ﬂ T −1, and {εj,M}
J
j=1 a n du s e st h e mi nm a k i n g




j=1 a r ek n o w nb yt h ea g e n ta n da r ei nt h ei n f o r m a t i o ns e tIa but the values of ε(a +
k,t(a + k),δ(a + k)), k>0 are not. Agents may or may not know θ.
One possible speci￿cation of the information structure of the model regarding θ is the
following.
(I-1) At age a, each element of θ is either known to the agent or it is not known. Thus,
when revelation about θ occurs, it is instantaneous.
This assumption rules out gradual learning, such as standard Bayesian updating. We further
assume that
47Thus we assume that
θj ⊥ ⊥ ε(a,t(a),δ(a)) for all j,a,t(a),δ(a); ε(a,t(a),δ(a)) ⊥ ⊥ ε(a0,t 00(a0),δ
000 (a0)), for all a0,t 00(a0),δ
000 (a0);
except if a = a00, t00(a0)=t(a) and δ (a)=δ
000 (a0); ε(a,t(a),δ(a)) ⊥ ⊥ ξ (t(a)) for all a,t(a),δ(a);
θj ⊥ ⊥ ξ (t(a)) for all j,a; θ  ⊥ ⊥ εj,M for all   =1 ,...,L; j =1 ,...,J.
38(I-2) Information arrives about the elements of θ sequentially (e.g.,i nt h e￿rst a1 periods
of earnings only the ￿rst element of θ enters, in the next a2 periods the ￿rst two elements of
θ e n t e r ,a n ds oo n ) .I ft h elth element of θ aﬀects earnings at a  ≤ a,t h e ni ti sk n o w nb y
the agent at a  and ever after.
These assumptions allow for the possibility that agents may know some or all the elements
of θ at a given age a regardless of whether or not they determine earnings at or before age
a.O n c ek n o w n ,t h e ya r en o tf o r g o t t e n .A sa g e n t sa c c u m u l a t ei n f o r m a t i o n ,t h e yr e v i s et h e i r
forecasts of their future earnings prospects at subsequent stages of the decision process. This
aﬀects their decision rules and subsequent choices. Thus we allow for learning which can
aﬀect both pretreatment outcomes and posttreatment outcomes.48 We use this speci￿cation
in the empirical work reported in Heckman (2006). Other speci￿cations of the updating of
the information sets of agents are possible.49 All dynamic discrete choice models make some
assumptions about the updating of information and any rigorous identi￿cation analysis must
test among competing speci￿cations of information updating.
Variables unknown to the agent are integrated out by the agent in forming value functions.
Variables known to the agent are treated as constants by the agents. They are integrated
out by the econometrician. In general, the econometrician knows less than what the agent
knows. The econometrician seeks to identify the distributions in the agent information sets
that are used by the agents to form their expectations as well as the distributions of variables
known to the agent and treated as certain quantities by the agent but not known by the
econometrician. Determining which elements belong in the agent￿s information set can be
done using the methods exposited in Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005e) and Navarro
(2004b) who consider testing what components of X,Z,ξ,ε as well as θ are in the agent￿s
48This type of learning about unobservables is ruled out in the Abbring ￿ Van den Berg model (2003).
However, in our model, conditioning on the same information set Ia, the distributions of pretreatment costs
and earnings are the same for all persons irrespective of their treatment times.
49It is fruitful to distinguish models with exogenous arrival of information (so that information arrives at
each age a independent of any actions taken by the agent) from information that arrives as a result of choices
by the agent. Our model is in the ￿rst class. The model of Miller (1984) or Pakes (1986) are in the second
class.
39information set. We brie￿y discuss this issue at the end of the next section.50 We now
establish semiparametric identi￿cation of the model assuming a given information structure.
Determining the appropriate information structure facing the agent and its evolution is an
essential aspect of identifying any dynamic discrete choice model.
Observe that agents with the same information sets at age a, Ia, have the same expecta-
tions of future returns, and the same value functions. Persons with the same ex ante reward,
state and preference variables have the same ex ante distributions of stopping times. Ex post,
stopping times may diﬀer among agents with identical ex ante information sets. Controlling
for Ia, future realizations of stopping times do not aﬀe c tp a s tr e w a r d s .
3.1 Semiparametric identi￿cation of dynamic sequential discrete
choice models
Establishing semiparametric identi￿ability of our model is a nontrivial task because of its
intrinsic nonlinearity. Our strategy is as follows. Using limit set arguments which we specify
below, we can identify the joint distributions of earnings (for each treatment time t across a)
and any associated measurements that do not depend on the stopping time chosen. For each
stopping time, we can construct the means of earnings outcomes at each age and of the mea-
surements and the joint distributions of the unobservables for earnings and measurements.
Factor analyzing the joint distributions of the unobservables, under conditions speci￿ed in
CHH and Navarro (2004a), we identify the factor loadings, and nonparametrically identify
the distributions of the factors and the independent components of the error terms in the
earnings and measurement equations. Armed with this knowledge, we can use choice data
to identify the distribution of the components of the cost functions that are not directly
observed. We can also construct the joint distributions of outcomes across stopping times.
To simplify the notation in our proofs, we use the condensed forms for the variables
50Our model of learning is clearly very barebones. Information arrives exogenously across ages. In the
factor model, all agents who advance to a stage get information about additional factors at that stage of their
life cycles but the realizations of the factors may diﬀer across persons. Urzua (2005) extends this analysis.
40U (t,0), U (t,1), U (0), U (1), U, Y (t,0,X),Y(t,1,X), Y (0,X), Y (1,X), Y (X), μ(t,0,X),
μ(t,1,X), μ(0,X), μ(1,X), μ(X), W, Φ(X,Z) and Υ(X,Z) that were introduced in
Section 2.3. We also de￿ne M =( M1,...,M J), UM =( U1,M,. . . ,U J,M) and μM(X)=
(μ1,M(X),...,μ J,M(X)).T h eX may have subvectors depending on time but to simplify the
analysis we suppress the individual elements. We embed the restriction that when δ(a)=1 ,
a ≥ t(a) and restrict ourselves to counterfactuals and factuals with arguments that satisfy
this property.
Using this notation, we can state our identi￿cation strategy more precisely. Using limit
sets that make the probability of each stopping time, t =1 ,...,ﬂ T,arbitrarily close to 1,w e
construct the joint distribution of (Y (t,0,X),Y(t,1,X),M) including the joint distribution
of U(0,t), U(1,t) and UM. Using factor analysis, we determine the factor loadings, and
identify the joint distribution of θ, ε, ξ nonparametrically. With the factor loadings and these
distributions in hand, we can use choice data to identify the mean of the cost function in the
terminal schooling choice (Φ(ﬂ T −1,X,Z)) and the distribution of unobservable components
of costs W(ﬂ T−1). Backward inducting, we can identify the Φ(t,X,Z) and the distribution of
W(t) for the remaining transitions. Using our factor structure, we can identify the full joint
distributions of ex post outcomes and measurements (Y (1,X),Y(0,X),M ) across stopping
times. We ￿rst establish identi￿cation of the joint distribution of (Y (t,0,X),Y(t,1,X),M)
for each t.
Theorem 4. Assume that
(i) U,UM and W are continuous random variables with mean zero, ￿nite variance and
support Supp(U) ￿ Supp(UM) ￿ Supp(W) with upper and lower limits ﬂ U, ﬂ UM, ﬂ W
and U,UM,W, respectively, which may be bounded or in￿n i t e . W ea s s u m et h a tt h i s
condition applies to each component of U, UM,a n dW, and all possible combinations
of components. The cumulative distribution function of W (t(a)),t(a)=1 ,...,ﬂ T
is assumed to be strictly increasing over its full support (W (t(a)), ﬂ W (t(a))), for all
t(a)=1 ,...,ﬂ T.
41(ii) (X,Z) ⊥ ⊥ (U,UM,W).
(iii) Supp(μ(X),μ M(X),Φ(X,Z)) = Supp(μ(X))￿Supp(μM(X))￿Supp(Φ(X,Z)) and
this holds element by element.
(iv) Supp(Φ(X,Z)) ⊇ Supp(−Υ(X,Z)) and this holds element by element within each
vector.
Then, μ(a,t(a),δ(a),X),μ M(X), the joint distribution of (U (a,t(a),δ(a)),U M) are iden-
ti￿ed.51
Proof. Assumptions (iii) and (iv) are suﬃcient conditions for limit sets Z1 and Z0 to exist
such that limX,Z→Z1 P(T = t(a) | X,Z)=1 , i.e., there is a limit set in which the indi-
viduals are observed to stop at a, T = t(a) and hence δ(a)=1with probability one, and
limX,Z→Z0 P (T = t(a) | X,Z)=0 , so that there is a limit set of individuals who remain in
school at a = t(a) so δ(a)=0with probability one in that limit set. One way to satisfy this
condition is through exclusion restrictions: having an element in each Z(j),c a l li tZ∗(j),
that is not in X or Z(j0),j6= j0, assuming that the Φ(j,X,Z(j)) is monotonic in Z∗(j), and
assuming that the Z∗(j) can be independently varied, conditional on all of the remaining Z
and the X. Since future costs enter this probability, we can potentially use any argument
of Φ(t(a0),X,Z(t(a0))),a 0 >ato obtain these limits. Furthermore, with time varying
components of X,s o m ee l e m e n t so ff u t u r eX might be available to achieve the required vari-
ation, provided support conditions are met. Under the limit set assumption, identi￿cation of
μ(a,t(a),δ(a),X), μM(X) and the marginal distribution of (U (a,t(a),δ(a)),U M) follows
immediately.
Identi￿cation of the joint distribution of (UM,U) follows from the fact that, in the limit
s e t ,w ec a nf o r mt h el e f th a n ds i d eo f
Pr(UM <m− μM (X),U <y− μ(X) | X = x)=FUM,U (m − μM (x),y− μ(x)).
51Recall that we restrict the admissible counterfactuals to have arguments that satisfy a>t (a) when
δ(a)=1 .
42We can trace out this distribution by ￿nding vectors q1 and q2 de￿ned so q1 = m − μM (X)
and q2 = y−μ(X) and by independently varying the points of evaluation of the components
of q1 and q2. ¥
This theorem applies to any known transformation of the Y and M that satis￿es the
property of separability of the errors. Notice that we do not need conventional exclusion
restrictions to identify the objects produced from Theorem 4. Notice further that we do not
need to invoke the Matzkin conditions or the linearity-in-parameters conditions for the cost
function to secure identi￿cation of the joint distribution of outcomes and measurements for
each stopping time.
From this theorem, we can produce average treatment eﬀects for outcomes for any pair
of stopping times.52 To produce the joint distribution of outcomes across stopping times, we
can use factor analysis applied to the joint distribution as described in Section 2.5. Under
conditions on the unobservables speci￿ed in CHH and Navarro (2004a), we can nonparamet-
rically identify the distribution of the factors and the uniquenesses (the ε and ξ) associated
with outcomes and measurements for each stopping time. CHH only use information on
the covariances to identify the factor loadings.53 In place of the information from the index
generating choices that was used in the analysis of Section 2.5, in this section, because we are
using limit sets that ￿x treatment times, it is necessary to use measurements to produce the
52The average treatment eﬀects are identi￿ed using only the marginal distributions.
53They also assume a ￿triangular￿ structure on the matrix of factor loadings for their principal results.
This structure assumes that there are two (or more) measurements or outcomes that depend only on θ1;
two (or more) measurements or outcomes that depend only on θ1 and θ2 and so forth. Use of covariance
information limits the number of factors that can be nonparametrically identi￿ed. Thus for an outcome and
measurement vector J of length N, N>2L +1
J =
⎛
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
α11 00 ••• 0
α21 00 ••• 0





αN1 αN2 αN3 ••• αNL
⎞

























⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
where the last block must have three or more elements and each of the N − 3 preceding rows has at least
a block of two rows with the same pattern of zeros, the column vector of the ξi has mutually independent
elements and is independent of the θi,a n dt h eθi are mutually independent. See Anderson and Rubin (1956).
CHH also establish identi￿cation of a nontriangular structure.
43factor loadings generating outcomes across treatment times.54 Navarro (2004a) shows that if
the distribution of the factors is not symmetric, we can uniquely identify the factor structure
without any measurements if we gain additional information from the higher order moments
beyond the covariances used in section 2.5. See also Bonhomme and Robin (2004).55
Notice that measurements, M, are not needed to prove Theorem 4. Notice further that,
54Without the measurements, using only covariance information on outcomes it is not possible to identify
the sign of the factor loadings across systems of outcomes associated with diﬀerent stopping times unless the
conditions speci￿ed in Navarro (2004a) are satis￿ed. See Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005e) or Carneiro,
Hansen, and Heckman (2001) for intuitive discussions of these conditions. See also the survey in Heckman,
Lochner, and Todd (2006).
55The following example that builds on the analysis of Section 2.5 illustrates Navarro￿s results and the
related results by Bonhomme and Robin (2004). Assume a one factor model and two systems associated
with two stopping times identi￿ed in limit sets. We use three outcomes. The ￿rst subscript de￿nes the
system used:
Y0,1 = α0,1θ + ε0,1 Y1,1 = α1,1θ + ε1,1
Y0,2 = α0,2θ + ε0,2 Y1,2 = α1,2θ + ε1,2
Y0,3 = α0,3θ + ε0,3 Y1,3 = α1,3θ + ε1,3
where θ ⊥ ⊥ (ε0,1,ε 0,2,ε 0,3,ε 1,1,ε 1,2,ε 1,3) and the εi,j are mutually independent and mean zero with ￿nite
variances. θ has mean zero and a ￿nite variance. We observe data on the (Y0,1,Y 0,2,Y 0,3) system or the
(Y1,1,Y 1,2,Y 1,3) system but not both.
Suppose we normalize α0,1 =1 . Using the analysis of Section 2.5, we can identify α0,2,α 0,3 and the








Then, assuming α1,1 6=0 ,α 1,2 6=0 ,α 1,3 6=0and σ2




α1,3 so α1,2 =
Cov(Y1,1,Y1,2)











The sign of α1,3 is not determined.
If, however, we use the assumption that θ is non-normal and E(θ












where we know all of the ingredients on the right hand side. Thus we can identify α1,2,α 1,3 and hence
can form the joint distribution of (Y0,1,Y 0,2,Y 0,3,Y 1,1,Y 1,2,Y 1,3). Navarro shows that we need only one
measurement per factor so one can relax the bound N>2L +1 . There is related work by Bonhomme and
Robin (2004).
44while there are formal similarities to the duration model for time to treatment developed
in Section 2, there are important diﬀerences that arise because the model of this section is




is a function of expected future
outcomes. The proof strategy used in Section 2 is applied in reverse order.
We now establish identi￿ability of the parameters of the last choice index, including the
parameters of the cost function. We then proceed to identify the next to last index and
proceed backward to the initial stage choice index. We start by analyzing the last transition
(from ﬂ T −1 to ﬂ T). Notice that once an individual is at ﬂ T, his remaining lifetime value is no
longer a function of cost (and hence Z) since no further transitions are possible. The temporal
structure of the ￿nite horizon decision problem produces natural exclusion restrictions and
we exploit it. We now prove the following theorem which demonstrates this point.
Theorem 5. Assume that conditions (i)￿(iv) of Theorem 4 hold. In particular, one impli-




¡ﬂ T − 1,X,Z





¡ﬂ T − 1,X
¢¢
.
We assume that Φ
¡ﬂ T − 1,X,Z
¡ﬂ T − 1
¢¢
belongs to the class of Matzkin functions, and that
r is known. Then, the mean cost function Φ(ﬂ T −1,X,Z
¡ﬂ T − 1
¢
), the marginal distribution
of Υ
¡ﬂ T − 1,X
¢
, the factor loadings λﬂ T−1 and the distribution of ξ(ﬂ T − 1) are identi￿ed for
all X. If we specify the Φ
¡ﬂ T − 1,X,Z
¡ﬂ T − 1
¢¢
only up to scale, we identify the cost function
and the marginal distribution of Υ
¡ﬂ T − 1,X
¢
up to the scale as well as the distribution of
ξ(ﬂ T − 1).
Proof. As a consequence of assumptions (iii)a n d( iv) of Theorem 4, a limit set ￿ Z exists
such that limX,Z→ ￿ Z Pr(T>ﬂ T − 2 | X,Z)=1 . One way to obtain the limit set is to assume
that for all t(a) there is at least one continuous variable Zj (t(a)) that is not contained
in any other Z (t(a0)) (a0 6= a) (where subscripts denote components of Z(t(a)))o ri nX,
that Φ(t(a),X,Z(t(a))) is monotonic in Zj (t(a)), that there are no restrictions on the
supports, and that variation in Zj(t(a)) traces out the full support of Υ(X,Z) to satisfy
45(iv) of Theorem 4. However, we can satisfy this requirement without having a conventional
exclusion.
Recall that an individual, conditional on having reached ﬂ T − 1 with probability one in
the limit set ￿ Z and conditional on X =￿ x and Z(ﬂ T −1) = z(ﬂ T −1), will stop at stage ﬂ T −1
if Φ
¡ﬂ T − 1, ￿ x,z
¡ﬂ T − 1
¢¢
+ Υ
¡ﬂ T − 1, ￿ x
¢
> 0. Under assumption (iii) of Theorem 4, we can
freely vary Φ(ﬂ T − 1, ￿ x,z
¡ﬂ T − 1
¢
) by varying z(ﬂ T − 1) while keeping X =￿ x ￿xed. Alterna-
tively, we could ￿x μ(X)=k and still be able to vary Φ without having to ￿xt h ee n t i r eX
vector since Υ
¡ﬂ T − 1, ￿ x
¢
only depends on X through the eﬀect of mean earnings on the value
functions. In this way we would not require that some elements of Z be diﬀerent from ele-
ments of X. Observe that Υ
¡ﬂ T − 1, ￿ x
¢
is a random variable that is statistically independent
of Z(ﬂ T − 1) given X =￿ x (or μ(X)=k). Since we can freely vary Φ
¡ﬂ T − 1, ￿ x,z
¡ﬂ T − 1
¢¢
in the limit set, conditional on X =￿ x, we can use standard proofs for identi￿cation in
ab i n a r yc h o i c em o d e l . I fΦ(ﬂ T − 1,X,Z
¡ﬂ T − 1
¢
) is in the Matzkin class, we can identify
Φ
¡ﬂ T − 1, ￿ x,z
¡ﬂ T − 1
¢¢
over its support for X =￿ x and the distribution of Υ
¡ﬂ T − 1, ￿ x
¢
for a
given X =￿ x.




M<m (￿ x),Y(ﬂ T) <y
¡ﬂ T,￿ x
¢
| T = ﬂ T,X =￿ x,Z
¡ﬂ T − 1
¢
= z




T = ﬂ T | X =￿ x,Z
¡ﬂ T − 1
¢
= z
¡ﬂ T − 1
¢¢
.
Varying y(ﬂ T,￿ x), m(￿ x) and −Φ
¡ﬂ T − 1, ￿ x,z
¡ﬂ T − 1
¢¢
, and adjusting for μM(￿ x) and μ(￿ x) we



















¡ﬂ T − 1, ￿ x,z
¡ﬂ T − 1
¢¢
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
X =￿ x,Z
¡ﬂ T − 1
¢
= z





46Notice that we require that both Y (ﬂ T) and M be continuous random variables so that we
can trace the distribution conditional on X =￿ x by varying y(ﬂ T,￿ x) and m(￿ x).56
U pt ot h i sp o i n ti nt h ep r o o fw eh a v en o ti n v o k e daf a c t o rs t r u c t u r ea n di ti sn o tn e e d e d .






¡ﬂ T − 1, ￿ x
¢¢
we can
identify the factor loadings on the θ in the cost functions. To show this, suppose that the
unobservables associated with measurements M1, a subvector of M,o n l yd e p e n do nθ1 and







¡ﬂ T − 1, ￿ x
¢¢
conditional on X =￿ x,Z(ﬂ T − 1) = z(ﬂ T − 1), we can construct




¡ﬂ T − 1, ￿ x
¢











¡ﬂ T − 1, ﬂ T − 1, ￿ x
¢
− Y















ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
X =￿ x,







where on the right hand side of the equation λ1,ﬂ T−1 is the coeﬃcient on θ1 in the (ﬂ T − 1)st
cost function. The left hand side of this expression, the ￿rst term on the right hand side,
α1,1,M and σ2
θ1 are known from Theorem 4 after applying factor analysis to outcomes and
measurements. (This assumes that either the conditions in CHH or Navarro, 2004a, are
met.) We can use this covariance to identify λ1,ﬂ T−1,s i n c ew ek n o wα1,1,M and σ2
θ1 from a
factor analysis of the measurement system. Proceeding sequentially, taking covariances of
the choice index with equations that depend on additional elements of θ, we identify all of the
loadings λﬂ T−1 associated with the cost function under the conditions on the factors speci￿ed
in CHH or Navarro (2004a). This requires additional measurements M that depend on the
factors in the cost function. In addition, this analysis assumes a triangular factor loading
56We only need some components of M to be continuous. See CHH or the analysis in Appendix D.
47matrix as previously discussed.57 Once knowledge of the λﬂ T−1 is secured, we can identify the
distribution of ξ
¡ﬂ T − 1
¢
by using deconvolution applied to the distribution of Υ
¡ﬂ T − 1, ￿ x
¢
,
which is nonparametrically identi￿ed. Υ
¡ﬂ T − 1,X
¢
can be represented as
Υ
¡ﬂ T − 1,X
¢
= ξ
¡ﬂ T − 1
¢
+ θλﬂ T−1 + R

















where X =￿ x, Z(ﬂ T−1) = z(ﬂ T−1) are contained in the agent￿s information set at ﬂ T−1, Iﬂ T−1.
We identify the Y functions and their distribution for all ages for each t as a consequence of
Theorem 4. Thus we can construct the R functions and their distribution which only depend
on the Y functions and their distribution. We know the factor loadings and the distribution
of the factors (θ). Hence we know the distribution of R(ﬂ T − 1, ﬂ T − 1, ￿ x) − Y (ﬂ T − 1, ﬂ T −








. Therefore we know the distribution of the sum of the
terms on the right hand side after ξ
¡ﬂ T − 1
¢
in the expression Υ




¡ﬂ T − 1
¢
is independent of the remaining terms on the right hand side. Finally, we can vary
X = x to identify the Φ
¡ﬂ T − 1,x,z
¡ﬂ T − 1
¢¢
for all X = x up to the scale of Υ
¡ﬂ T − 1,x
¢
.
We can construct all of the components of the distribution of Υ
¡ﬂ T − 1,x
¢
and the joint
distribution of any subcomponent. Hence we also know the scale of Υ
¡ﬂ T − 1,X
¢
for all
X = x. ¥





¡ﬂ T − 1, ﬂ x
¢
or the mean of the cost function Φ
¡ﬂ T − 1, ￿ x,z
¡ﬂ T − 1
¢¢
. The measure-
ments are only used to recover the distribution of the unobservables in the cost function
and the associated factor loadings. Thus we can identify the discrete choice model and the
associated outcome without using any measurements.
Theorem 5 establishes conditions under which we can identify all of the elements of the
cost function for the last transition. We can determine the scale if one element of cost is
57This proof can be modi￿ed to accommodate other factor structure assumptions but we do not do so
here.
48known to the econometrician (e.g. tuition). This corresponds to a special case of the Matzkin
functions. This analysis is predicated on a particular information set. A component of the
information set used in the proof of Theorem 5 is that θ1 is known to the agent at ﬂ T −1.I fi t
is not, then λ1, ﬂ T−1 =0and our proof simpli￿es. Alternative speci￿cations of the information
set produce diﬀerent distributions of Υ
¡ﬂ T − 1,X
¢
and more generally Υ(X).
The proof assumes a known interest rate r. This assumption simpli￿es the proof but is not
essential to it. To see how r is identi￿ed, note that under assumption (ii)o fT h e o r e m5 ,t h e
terminal values R
¡ﬂ T − 1, ﬂ T − 1,X
¢
and R
¡ﬂ T, ﬂ T,X
¢
depend on X only through the means
of the Y (t,1,X) equations. See equation (3) for the explicit representation and equation (4)
for the de￿nition of the R terms. Under our assumptions about the information known to the
agent, (including assumptions (I-1) and (I-2)), and because of the independence produced
from assumption (ii), E
¡
R




also depends on X only through the mean
functions μ(a,t(a),1,X) in equation (3).58
If we adjoin to the assumptions invoked in Theorem 5, the assumption that
Supplementary Assumption (**) to Theorem 5: μ
¡ﬂ T − 1, ﬂ T − 1,1,X
¢
and μ
¡ﬂ T, ﬂ T,1,X
¢
are continuous and diﬀerentiable in at least one argument of X,
w ec a nu s et h ei n d e xp r o p e r t yo ft h ec h o i c em o d e lt oc o m p u t e
∂ Pr
¡
T = ﬂ T | X,Z
¢
∂μ




T = ﬂ T | X,Z
¢
∂μ
¡ﬂ T, ﬂ T,1,X
¢
=1+r (6)
because we can freely vary the mean functions generating R
¡ﬂ T − 1, ﬂ T − 1,X
¢
and R
¡ﬂ T, ﬂ T,X
¢
under assumption (iii) of Theorem 4, and the derivatives exist because we assume that the
random variables generating the unobservables in (5) are absolutely continuous with respect
to Lebesgue measure. Clearly we can use other combinations of the mean functions gener-
ating R
¡ﬂ T − 1, ﬂ T − 1,X
¢
and R
¡ﬂ T, ﬂ T,X
¢
to identify r, provided a version of assumption
58We know μ(a,t(a),1,X) as a result of Theorem 4.
49(**) holds for the selected mean functions. Observe that the choice of a scale function for
the Matzkin class is irrelevant since the scale cancels. Formula (6) for the Matzkin class is
a version of Powell, Stock, and Stoker (1989) or Horowitz (1998).
If we only specify the Matzkin class of functions up to scale, this theorem is not strong
enough to identify the cost functions for the preceding transitions even up to scale. In the
transitions before ﬂ T − 1, costs appear in the ￿nal reward functions. Thus the choice index
for transition ﬂ T − 2 is
I
¡ﬂ T − 2, ﬂ T − 2,Iﬂ T−2
¢
= R
¡ﬂ T − 2, ﬂ T − 2,X
¢
− K
¡ﬂ T − 2, ﬂ T − 2,Iﬂ T−2
¢
= R
¡ﬂ T − 2, ﬂ T − 2,X
¢
− Y
¡ﬂ T − 2, ﬂ T − 2,0,X
¢
+C
¡ﬂ T − 2,X,Z
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Y
¡ﬂ T − 1, ﬂ T − 1,0,X
¢
−C
¡ﬂ T − 1,X,Z
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⎠
⎫
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.
Knowledge of C
¡ﬂ T − 1,X,Z
¡ﬂ T − 1
¢¢
measured in the same scale as R
¡ﬂ T − 2, ﬂ T − 2,X
¢
is
required to form V
¡ﬂ T − 1, ﬂ T − 1,Iﬂ T−1
¢
. The following theorem, which draws on Matzkin
(1994), gives two conditions under which the unknown scale on the cost function can be
determined, if it is not speci￿ed by assuming that Φ
¡ﬂ T − 1,X,Z
¡ﬂ T − 1
¢¢
is in the Matzkin
class.
Theorem 6. Assume either that:
(i) It is possible to partition X =
‡
￿ X, ￿ X
·
so that the elements of ￿ X do not enter
Φ
¡ﬂ T − 1,X,Z
¡ﬂ T − 1
¢¢
. Furthermore, assume additive separability of the mean out-
50come function for Y (ﬂ T − 1, ﬂ T − 1,j,X) in terms of the two components:
μ













(ii) It is possible to partition Z





¡ﬂ T − 1
¢
, ￿ Z
¡ﬂ T − 1
¢·
and that the cost func-
tion has an additively separable component with a known coeﬃcient:
Φ
¡ﬂ T − 1,X,Z




ﬂ T − 1,X, ￿ Z
¡ﬂ T − 1
¢·
+ ￿ Z
¡ﬂ T − 1
¢
so that ￿ Z
¡ﬂ T − 1
¢
is measured in the same units as R
¡ﬂ T − 2, ﬂ T − 2,X
¢
.T h i sw o u l d
b et h ec a s ei f ,f o re x a m p l e , ￿ Z
¡ﬂ T − 1
¢
measured direct costs of schooling (e.g. tuition
in our schooling example).
Then, if either (i) or (ii), or both hold, the scale of Υ
¡ﬂ T − 1,X
¢
in Theorem 5 is identi￿ed.
Proof. Part (ii) is immediate, because we set the scale of one coeﬃcient and can use its
identi￿ed coeﬃcient in the choice equation to identify the scale of Υ
¡ﬂ T − 1,X
¢
.( S e eM a t z k i n
(1994)). Part (i)i sa l s os t r a i g h t f o r w a r db e c a u s ew ec a nd e t e r m i n en∗ ¡ﬂ T − 1, ﬂ T − 1,1, ￿ x
¢
from the limit sets of the outcome equations and it also enters the choice equation and
identi￿es the scale. ¥
We next consider identi￿cation of the cost function for transition ﬂ T −2 under the assump-
tion that we can identify the scale at ﬂ T −1. The distribution of Υ
¡ﬂ T − 2,X,Z
ﬂ T−1¢
depends
on X and Z
¡ﬂ T − 1
¢
because all future returns and costs are in the value function. The
key insight in our theorem is to note that the dependence on Z
¡ﬂ T − 1
¢
is not general but
operates through the function Φ
¡ﬂ T − 1,X,Z
¡ﬂ T − 1
¢¢
which was identi￿ed by the preceding
argument.
Theorem 7. Assume conditions (i)￿(iv) of Theorem 4. Assume that Φ
¡ﬂ T − 1,X,Z
¡ﬂ T − 1
¢¢




¡ﬂ T − 2,X,Z





¡ﬂ T − 2,X,Z
ﬂ T−1¢¢






¡ﬂ T − 2,X,Z
¡ﬂ T − 2
¢¢
,Φ
¡ﬂ T − 1,X,Z






¡ﬂ T − 2,X,Z
¡ﬂ T − 2
¢¢¢
￿ Supp(Φ(ﬂ T − 1,X,Z
¡ﬂ T − 1
¢
)) which follows from
condition (iii) of Theorem 4 applied element by element.
In addition to assumptions (i)-(iv) of Theorem 4, assume that
(***) The conditions of Theorem 6 apply so that we can identify the scale of the cost function
in the last transition, ﬂ T − 1.
Then, Φ
¡ﬂ T − 2,X,Z
¡ﬂ T − 2
¢¢
, the marginal distribution of Υ
¡ﬂ T − 2,X,Z
ﬂ T−1¢
, the factor
loadings λﬂ T−2, and the distribution of ξ(ﬂ T − 2) are identi￿ed for all X,Z
ﬂ T−2. Alternatively
if we specify the Matzkin class of functions up to scale we identify Φ
¡ﬂ T − 2,X,Z
¡ﬂ T − 2
¢¢
and the distribution of Υ
¡ﬂ T − 2,X,Z
ﬂ T−1¢
up to scale.
Proof. From Theorem 4, a limit set exists such that Pr(T>ﬂ T − 3 | X = x,Z = z)=1 .
Consider, in this limit set,
Pr
¡




Φ(ﬂ T − 2,x,z(ﬂ T − 2)) + Υ






¡ﬂ T − 2,x,z(ﬂ T − 1)
¢
depends on z(ﬂ T −1) only through Φ(ﬂ T −1,x,z(ﬂ T −1)).
As a consequence, we can express the preceding probability as
Pr(Φ(ﬂ T − 2,x,z(ﬂ T − 2)) + Υ
∗ ¡ﬂ T − 1,X,Φ(ﬂ T − 1,x,z(ﬂ T − 1))
¢
) > 0
where Υ∗ ¡ﬂ T − 1,x,Φ(ﬂ T − 1,x,z(ﬂ T − 1))
¢
shows the explicit dependence of Υ
¡ﬂ T − 2,x,z(ﬂ T − 1)
¢
on the mean cost function Φ(ﬂ T − 1,x,z(ﬂ T − 1)). From assumption (iii) of Theorem 4, we
52can condition on Φ(ﬂ T − 1,x,z(ﬂ T − 1)) = ϕ and still be able to vary Φ(ﬂ T − 2,x,z(ﬂ T − 2))
freely. Therefore we can trace out the distribution of Υ
¡ﬂ T − 2,x,z(ﬂ T − 1)
¢
analogous to
the way we traced out the distribution of Υ
¡ﬂ T − 1,x
¢
in the proof of Theorem 5, and we
can construct the joint distribution of UM,U (ﬂ T −2), Υ
¡ﬂ T − 2,x,z(ﬂ T − 1)
¢
. We can mimic
the proof of Theorem 5 and identify λﬂ T−2 and the distribution of ξ(ﬂ T − 2).W ec a nd ot h i s
for all Z(ﬂ T − 2) = z(ﬂ T − 2), Z(ﬂ T − 1) = z(ﬂ T − 1) and X = x. As in the proof of Theorem
5, instead of conditioning on X we can also condition on μ(X)=k and we can still vary
for Φ
¡ﬂ T − 2,x,Z
¡ﬂ T − 1
¢¢
without having to ￿xt h ee n t i r eX vector. In this way we do not
require some elements of Z to be diﬀerent from X.If we specify the Matzkin class only up to
scale the proof only goes through for Φ
¡ﬂ T − 2,x,Z
¡ﬂ T − 1
¢¢
up to the unknown scale and
the distribution of the unobservables up to scale. ¥
The easiest way to satisfy the conditions of Theorem 7 is to assume access to Z(t),
t =1 ,...,ﬂ T−1, that are mutually statistically independent of each other. This is far stronger
than what is required to secure identi￿cation. We can allow the Z(t) to be dependent but
we need to rule out any degeneracy in the joint distribution of Z(t), t =1 ,...,ﬂ T. Z(t)
variables with these properties would arise if there are stopping-time-speci￿cc o s tv a r i a b l e s
(e.g. college tuition for college; school fees for secondary levels, etc.). However, Theorem 7
would still apply if the same Z variables appear in each stopping-time-speci￿cc o s tf u n c t i o n ,
provided that we satisfy the generalization of condition (iii) of Theorem 4. Theorem 7 is a
generalization of Corollary 1 of Section 2 that applies to an explicitly formulated, forward-
looking model.59 When the same Z appears in each cost function, it is required that the
curvature of the mean cost functions diﬀer across stopping times in order to satisfy the
condition. It is necessary that Z be a vector. If Z is scalar, condition (iii)o fT h e o r e m4
fails. We need to modify Theorem 6 to identify the absolute scale of the cost function at
stage T − 2.
59Corollary 1 applies only to the index functions as they enter the limits of the integrals generating the
expressions. Theorem 7 generalizes this result to include dependence of the distributions of the generated
random variables on the index functions of the model.
53Proceeding sequentially across stopping times with suitably modi￿ed conditions (i)￿(iv)
in Theorem 4, enables us to identify all of the cost functions at all stages of the process
provided that we modify Theorem 6 appropriately. This allows us, for each stopping time,
to identify private valuations (costs) and separate them from objective outcomes. Thus, in
the context of models of health economics, we can separate outcomes of a treatment from
the psychic costs of taking it at a particular time.60
In this model, analysts can distinguish period by period ex ante expected returns from
ex post realizations by applying the analysis of Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005e) and
Navarro (2004b). Because we can link choices to outcomes through the factor structure
assumption, we can also distinguish ex ante preference or cost parameters from their ex post
realizations. Ex ante,a g e n t sm a yn o tk n o wθ. Ex post,t h e yd o . A l lo ft h ei n f o r m a t i o n
about future rewards and returns is embodied in the information set Ia. Unless the time of
treatment is known with perfect certainty, it cannot cause outcomes prior to its realization.
Thus in an environment of uncertainty we rule out the possibility that the future can cause
the past￿a possibility that is not ruled out in the reduced form models of Section 2, except
by imposing it directly onto the parameters of the model.
Our analysis is predicated on speci￿cation of the agent￿s information sets which should
be carefully distinguished from the econometrician￿s. Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005e)
and Navarro (2004b) present methods for determining which components of future outcomes
are in the information sets of agents at each age, Ia. If they are unknown to the agent at age a,
under rational expectations, agents form their value functions used to make schooling choices
by integrating out the unknown components using the distributions in their information
sets. Components that are known to the agent are treated as constants by the individual
in forming the value function but as unknown variables by the econometrician and their
distribution is estimated. The true information set of the agent is determined from the set of
possible speci￿cations of the information sets of agents by picking the speci￿cation that best
60In the analysis of CHH and Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005a,b,c,e), psychic costs of schooling are
distinguished from monetary returns.
54￿ts the data on choices and outcomes penalizing for parameter estimation. Heuristically,
if neither the agent nor the econometrician knows a variable, the econometrician identi￿es
the determinants of the distribution of the unknown variables that is used by the agent to
form expectations. If the agent knows some variables, but the econometrician does not, the
econometrician seeks to identify the distribution of the variables, but the agent treats the
v a r i a b l e sa sk n o w nc o n s t a n t s .
We can identify all of the treatment parameters including pairwise ATE,t h em a r g i n a l
treatment eﬀect MTE for each transition (obtained by ￿nding mean outcomes for individuals
indiﬀerent between transitions), all of the treatment on the treated and treatment on the
untreated parameters and the population distribution of treatment eﬀects by applying the
analysis of CHH and Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005e) to this model. See also the
discussion in appendix B. Our analysis can easily be generalized to cover the case where
there are vectors of contemporaneous outcome measures for diﬀerent stopping times and
ages, building on the analysis of Appendix D modi￿ed to suit this more precisely formulated
choice model. We next discuss how to implement the limit set strategy.
3.2 Implementing the limit set strategy and checking for identi￿-
cation
Under our assumptions, the limit sets used in the theorems in this paper are obtained by
￿nding subsets of the data that make the probabilities of each stopping time T arbitrarily
close to 1. In any sample, we can check whether such subsets exist or are very thin, since we
can nonparametrically compute Pr(T = t | Z = z,X = x). Figure 2, taken from the research
of Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2004), shows the result of such an analysis.61 It plots the
sample distribution of probabilities of ￿nal schooling attainment (at age 30)f o rm a l e so v e r
all subsets of (X,Z) in the data. In the sample, one cannot ￿nd any subset with mass in the
probabilities near 1 for any ￿nal schooling choice. Thus in their sample, the required limit
61See also analysis of Heckman and Navarro (2006).
55sets.
One can argue that this problem will vanish in large samples. That is an assumption
that cannot be checked with data. Alternatively, one can argue that we obtain identi￿cation
of the distributions over a subset and develop bounds on the model (see Manski, 2003).
Another alternative is to assume that the partially identi￿ed distributions are real analytic
and continue them over the missing support using analytic continuation.62
Our limit set arguments identify outcome distributions for values of choice probabilities
that become big or small. They have a close resemblance to the assumption used in the recent
nonparametric structural literature (see Matzkin, 1994, 2003) that the econometrician knows
the function sought to be identi￿ed at some point, or points, of evaluation. In our context,
the function is an outcome distribution. That literature is unclear about how to select the
points of evaluation whereas our analysis provides guidance in terms of large or small values
of the probability of selection into states. We next turn to a comparison of the reduced form
and structural models analyzed in this paper.
3.3 Comparing Reduced Form and Structural Models
The reduced form model analyzed in Section 2 is typical of many reduced form statistical
approaches within which it is diﬃcult to make important conceptual distinctions. Because
the choice equation is not modeled explicitly, it is hard to use such frameworks to analyze
the decision makers￿ expectations, costs of treatment, the arrival of information, the content
of agent information sets and the consequences of the arrival of information for decisions
regarding time to treatment as well as outcomes. In particular, it is diﬃcult to distin-
guish ex post from ex ante valuations of outcomes. Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005e),
Navarro (2004b) and Heckman and Navarro (2006) present analyses that distinguish ex ante
anticipations from ex post realizations.63 In reduced form models, it is diﬃcult to make
the distinction between private evaluations and preferences (e.g. ￿costs￿ as de￿n e di nt h i s
62Heckman and Singer (1984) discuss this strategy.
63See the summary of this literature in Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2006).
56section) from objective outcomes (the Y variables).
Statistical and reduced form econometric approaches to analyzing dynamic counterfac-
tuals appeal to uncertainty to motivate the stochastic structure of models. They do not
explicitly characterize how agents respond to uncertainty or make treatment choices based
on the arrival of new information (see Robins, 1989, 1997, Lok, 2001, Gill and Robins, 2001,
Abbring and Van Den Berg, 2003, and Van der Laan and Robins, 2003). In addition, as
noted in section 2, in the reduced form models it is in principle possible to identify treat-
ment eﬀects where the future treatment time causes the past. Abbring and Van Den Berg
(2003), Gill and Robins (2001) and Lok (2001) rule this out by imposing restrictions on the
statistical treatment eﬀect model.64 The structural approach presented in this paper allows
for a clear treatment of the arrival of information, agent expectations, and the eﬀects of new
information on choice and its consequences. In an environment of imperfect certainty about
t h ef u t u r e ,i tr u l e so u tt h ef u t u r ec a u s i n gt h ep a s to n c et h ee ﬀects of agent information sets
are controlled for.
The structural model developed in this paper allows agents to learn about new factors
(components of θ) as they proceed sequentially through their life cycles. It also allows agents
to learn about other components of the model (see Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro, 2005e).
Agent anticipations of when they will stop and the consequences of alternative stopping times
can be revised sequentially. Their anticipated payoﬀs and stopping times are sequentially
revised as new information becomes available. The mechanism by which agents revise their
anticipations is modeled and identi￿ed. See Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005a,b,c,e)
for further discussion of these issues and Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2006) for a partial
survey of recent developments in the literature.
The clearest interpretation of the models in the statistical literature on dynamic treat-
ment eﬀects is as ex post selection-corrected analyses of distributions of events that have
occurred. In a model of perfect certainty, where ex post and ex ante choices and outcomes
64This is the ￿nonanticipating￿ assumption of Abbring and Van Den Berg (2003).
57are identical, the reduced form approach can be interpreted as a good approximation to
a clearly speci￿ed choice model. In a more general analysis with information arrival and
agent updating of information sets, the nature of the reduced form approximation is less
clear cut. Thus it is unclear what agent decision-making processes and information arrival
assumptions justify the conditional sequential randomization assumptions widely used in the
dynamic treatment eﬀect literature (see, e.g. R o b i n s ,1 9 8 9 ,1 9 9 7 ;G i l la n dR o b i n s ,2 0 0 1 ;L o k ,
2001; Van der Laan and Robins, 2003; Lechner and Miquel, 2002) which are also used in
branches of the dynamic discrete choice literature (see both Rust, 1987, and the survey in
Rust, 1994). Reduced form approaches are not clear about the source of the unobservables
and their relationship with conditioning variables. In reduced form analyses, the speci￿cation
of the stochastic structure of the unobservables and the relationship of the unobservables to
the observables is ad hoc. In the structural analysis, this speci￿cation emerges as part of the
analysis, as our discussion of the stochastic properties of the unobservables presented in the
preceding section makes clear.
The incompleteness intrinsic to reduced form models is illustrated in the analysis of
Abbring and Van Den Berg (2003). They present an innovative and technically rigorous
reduced form continuous time model of time to treatment where the treatment outcome is
itself a continuous time duration. As Corollary 2 in Section 2.4 demonstrates, we can produce
a discrete time counterpart to their model where the unobservables generating outcomes and
the time to treatment equation and the relationship between the two sets of unobservables
can be clearly modeled.
In their model, and in the reduced form models of Section 2, it is diﬃcult to specify or
determine what is in the agent￿s information set, how information is revised and the conse-
quences of information revision for choices. They obtain their intuitively plausible ￿nonantic-
ipation condition￿￿that the time of treatment does not aﬀect pretreatment outcomes￿by
assuming that, conditional on time-invariant variables (both observed and unobserved by the
econometrician), the pretreatment outcomes associated with two diﬀerent treatment times
58are the same up to and prior to the realization of the smaller of the two treatment times.
Their condition rules out the possibility that the future can cause the past but at the price of
assuming no learning about variables (observable and unobservable) that aﬀect expectations
of future outcomes and the choice of time to treatment after the process begins.
In our model, their assumption translates into the requirement that, conditional on initial
observables and unobservables, the distribution of earnings while in high school is the same
for those who become college graduates as it is for high school graduates who stop at that
level of schooling. This assumption rules out any learning about ability, tuition costs, and
the like, that can occur after the start of the process. We specify and identify diﬀerent
Y (t,0,X) processes for each information set. Agents with diﬀerent expectations and agents
with information sets that are revised over the courses of their life cycles may have diﬀerent
pre-treatment earnings and other outcome distributions. Using a well-posed economic model,
we do not need to rule out learning in the structural model of Section 3 and we can still rule
out the possibility that the future can cause the past. At each age a = t(a) in the schooling
process, agents update their information sets Ia = It(a) and form new expectations about
future outcomes. The mechanism for doing so is speci￿ed in the ￿rst part of this section.
The reduced form treatment approach is incomplete in the sense of not providing a formal
updating mechanism. Such updating is implicit in the conditioning sets that are sequentially
updated (see, e.g. Gill and Robins, 2001; Lok, 2001).
Our analysis of both structural and reduced form models relies heavily on limit set argu-
ments. They enable us to solve the selection problem in limit sets. The dynamic matching
models of Gill and Robins (2001) and Lok (2001) solve the selection problem by invoking
recursive conditional independence assumptions. In the context of our models, they assume
that the econometrician knows the θ or can eliminate the θ by conditioning on a suitable
set of variables. Our analysis entertains the possibility that analysts know substantially less
than the agents they study. It allows for some of the variables that would make matching
valid to be unobservable. Versions of recursive conditional independence assumptions are
59also used in the dynamic discrete choice literature (see the survey in Rust, 1994). Our factor
models allow us to construct the joint distribution of outcomes across stopping times. This
feature is missing from the statistical treatment eﬀect literature.
B o t ht h es t r u c t u r a la n dr e d u c e df o r mm o d e l ss h a r et h ep r o p e r t yt h a ti ti sp o s s i b l et o
generate counterfactual treatment histories that are ruled out by a stopping time model.
The index structure used to generate the model allows limits to be switched in the integrals
based on latent variables ￿ what we called the B −D problem in Section 2.4. This feature
is a consequence of the incomplete speci￿cation of both classes of models. We have not
derived either reduced form or structural stopping models from a more basic model with
the possibility of return from dropout states but which nonetheless exhibit the stopping
time property. Our identi￿cation strategy in this paper relies on the nonrecurrent nature of
treatment. We leave the task of formulating and identifying a general recurrent state version
of the model for another occasion.65
4 Relationship of Our Work to Previous Work
Rust (1994) presents a widely cited nonparametric nonidenti￿cation theorem for dynamic
discrete choice models. It is important to note the restrictive nature of his results. He
analyzes a recurrent state in￿nite horizon model in a stationary environment. He does not
exploit choice-speci￿c outcome information nor does he use any exclusion restrictions or cross
outcome-choice restrictions. He places no restrictions on period-speci￿c utility functions such
as concavity or linearity.
Magnac and Thesmar (2002) present an extended comment on Rust￿s analysis including
positive results for identi￿cation when the econometrician knows the distributions of unob-
servables, assumes that unobservables enter period-speci￿c utility functions in an additively
separable way and is willing to specify functional forms of utility functions or other ingredi-
65Our identi￿cation strategy of using limit sets can be applied to the nonrecurrent model provided that
we con￿ned subsets of (X,Z) such that in those subsets the probability of recurrence is zero. See Heckman,
Urzua, and Yates (2005).
60ents of the model, as do Pakes (1986), Keane and Wolpin (1997), Eckstein and Wolpin (1999),
and Hotz and Miller (1988, 1993). Magnac and Thesmar (2002) also consider the case where
one state (choice) is absorbing (as do Hotz and Miller (1993)) and where the value functions
a r ek n o w na tt h et e r m i n a la g e(ﬂ A) (as do Keane and Wolpin (1997) and Belzil and Hansen
(2002)). In our paper, each treatment time is an absorbing state. In a separate analysis,
Magnac and Thesmar consider the case where unobservables from the point of view of the
econometrician are correlated over time (or age a)a n dc h o i c e s( t) under the assumption that
the distribution of the unobservables is known. They also consider the case where exclusion
restrictions are available. Throughout their analysis, they maintain that the distribution of
the unobservables is known both by the agent and the econometrician.
Our analysis provides semiparametric identi￿cation of a ￿nite-horizon ￿nite-state model
with an absorbing state with semiparametric speci￿cations of reward and cost functions.66
Given that rewards are in value units, our utility function cannot be subjected to arbitrary
aﬃne transformations so that one source of nonidenti￿ability in Rust￿s analysis is eliminated.
We can identify the error distributions nonparametrically given our factor structure. We do
not have to assume either the functional form of the unobservables or knowledge of the entire
distribution of unobservables.
We present a fully speci￿ed structural model of choices and outcomes motivated by, but
not identical to, the analyses of Keane and Wolpin (1994, 1997) and Eckstein and Wolpin
(1999). In their setups, outcome and cost functions are parametrically speci￿ed. Their states
are recurrent while ours are absorbing. In our model, once an agent drops out of school,
the agent does not return. In their model,an agent who drops out can return. They do not
establish identi￿cation of their model whereas we establish semiparametric identi￿cation of
our model. We analyze models with more general times series processes for unobservables.
In our framework and theirs, agents learn about unobservables. In their framework, such
learning is about temporally independent shocks that do not aﬀect agent expectations about
66Although our main theorems are for additively separable reward and cost functions, additive separability
can be relaxed using the analysis of Matzkin (2003).
61returns relevant to possible future choices. The information just aﬀects the opportunity
costs of current choices. In our framework, learning aﬀects agent expectations about future
returns as well as opportunity costs.
Our model extends previous work by CHH and Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005a,b,c,e)
by considering explicit multiperiod dynamic models with information updating. They con-
sider one-shot decision models with information updating and associated outcomes.
Our analysis is related to that of Taber (2000). Like Cameron and Heckman (1998),
both our study and Taber￿s use identi￿cation-in-the-limit arguments.67 Taber considers
identi￿cation of a two period model with a general utility function whereas in Section 3 we
consider identi￿cation of a speci￿c form of the utility function (an earnings function) for a
multiperiod maximization problem. As in this paper, Taber allows for the sequential arrival
of information. His analysis is based on conventional exclusion restrictions, but we do not, as
demonstrated in appendix Theorem D.1, text Corollary 1 and in extensions of these results
in Section 3. We use outcome data in conjunction with the discrete dynamic choice data to
exploit cross equation restrictions, whereas he does not.
Our treatment of unobservables is more general than any discussion that appears in the
current dynamic discrete choice and dynamic treatment eﬀect literature. We do not invoke
the strong sequential conditional independence assumptions used in the dynamic treatment
eﬀect literature in statistics (Robins, 1989, 1997; Gill and Robins, 2001; Lok, 2001; Lechner
and Miquel, 2002), nor the closely related conditional temporal independence of unobserved
state variables given observed state variables invoked by Rust (1987), Hotz and Miller (1988,
1993), Manski (1993) and Magnac and Thesmar (2002) (in the ￿r s tp a r to ft h e i rp a p e r )
or the independence assumptions invoked by Wolpin (1984).68 We allow for more general
67Pakes and Simpson (1989) sketch a proof of identi￿cation of a model of the option values of patents that
is based on limit sets for an option model.
68Manski (1993) and Hotz and Miller (1993) use a synthetic cohort eﬀect approach that assumes that young
agents will follow the transitions of contemporaneous older agents in making their lifecycle decisions. The
synthetic cohort approach has been widely used in labor economics at least since Mincer (1974). Manski
and Hotz and Miller exclude any temporally dependent unobservables from their models. See MaCurdy
(1981) and Mincer (1974) for application of the synthetic cohort approach. For empirical evidence against
the assumption that the earnings of older workers are a reliable guide to the earnings of younger workers
62time series dependence in the unobservables than is entertained by Pakes (1986), Keane and
Wolpin (1997) or Eckstein and Wolpin (1999).69
Like Miller (1984) and Pakes (1986), we explicitly model, identify and estimate agent
learning that aﬀects expected future returns.70 Pakes and Miller assume functional forms for
the distributions of the error process and for the serial correlation pattern about information
updating and time series dependence. Our analysis of the unobservables is nonparametric
and we estimate, rather than impose, the stochastic structure of the information updating
process.
Virtually all papers in the literature, including our own, invoke rational expectations.
An exception is the analysis of Manski (1993) who replaces rational expectations with a
synthetic cohort assumption that choices and outcomes of one group can be observed (and
acted on) by a younger group. This assumption is more plausible in stationary environments
and excludes any temporal dependence in unobservables.71 In recent work, Manski (2004)
advocates use of elicited expectations as an alternative to the synthetic cohort approach.
While we use rational expectations, we estimate, rather than impose the structure of agent
information sets. Miller (1984), Pakes (1986), Keane and Wolpin (1997), and Eckstein and
Wolpin (1999) assume that they know the law governing the evolution of agent information
sets up to unknown parameters.72 Following the procedure presented in Cunha, Heckman,
and Navarro (2005a,b,c,e) and Navarro (2004b) we can test for what factors (θ)a p p e a ri n
agent information sets at diﬀerent stages of the life cycle and we identify the distributions
of the unobservables nonparametrically.
Our analysis of dynamic treatment eﬀects is comparable, in some aspects, to the re-
in models of earnings and schooling choices for recent cohorts of workers, see Heckman, Lochner, and Todd
(2006).
69Rust (1994) provides a clear statement of the stochastic assumptions underlying the dynamic discrete
choice literature up to the date of his survey.
70As previously noted, the previous literature assumes learning only about current costs.
71See Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2006) for evidence against stationarity assumptions in the analysis
of schooling choices for recent cohorts.
72They specify ap r i o r iparticular processes of information arrival as well as which components of the
unobservables agents know and act on, and which components they do not.
63cent continuous time duration analysis of Abbring and Van Den Berg (2003) discussed in
Section 3.3. They build a continuous time model of counterfactuals for outcomes that are
durations. They model treatment assignment time using a continuous time duration model.
Our analysis is in discrete time and builds on previous work by Heckman (1981a,c) on
heterogeneity and state dependence that identi￿es the causal eﬀect of employment (or un-
employment) on future employment (or unemployment).73 We model time to treatment and
associated vectors of outcome equations that may be discrete, continuous or mixed discrete-
continuous. In a discrete time setting, we are able to generate a variety of distributions
of counterfactuals and economically motivated parameters. We allow for heterogeneity in
responses to treatment that has a general time series structure.
A sn o t e di nS e c t i o n3 . 3 ,A b b r i n ga n dV a nD e nB e r g( 2 0 0 3 )d on o ti d e n t i f ye x p l i c i ta g e n t
i n f o r m a t i o ns e t sa sw ed oi nt h i sp a p e ra n di nC u n h a ,H e c k m a n ,a n dN a v a r r o( 2 0 0 5 e )a n d
they do not model learning about future rewards. Their outcomes are restricted to be con-
tinuous time durations. Our discrete time framework avoids many of the technical measure
theoretic problems that they and Gill and Robins (2001) encounter in continuous time by
using discrete time analysis. We can attach a vector of treatment outcomes that includes
continuous outcomes, discrete outcomes and durations expressed as binary strings.74 At a
practical level, we can produce very ￿ne-grained descriptions of continuous time phenomena
by using models with many ￿nite periods. Clearly a synthesis of the Abbring ￿ Van Den Berg
approach with our approach would be highly desirable. That would entail taking continuous
time limits of the discrete time models developed in this paper. It is a task we leave for
another occasion.
Flinn and Heckman (1982) utilize information on stopping times and associated wages
to use cross equation restrictions to partially identify an equilibrium job search model for
a stationary economic environment where agents have an in￿nite horizon. They establish
73Heckman and Borjas (1980) investigate these issues in a continuous time duration model. See also
Heckman and MaCurdy (1980).
74Abbring (2000) considers nonparametric identi￿cation of semi-Markov event history models that extends
his work with Van Den Berg.
64that the model is nonparametrically nonidenti￿ed. Their analysis shows that use of outcome
data in conjunction with data on stopping times is not suﬃcient to secure nonparametric
identi￿cation. Allowing for nonstationarity arising from ￿nite horizons can break their non-
identi￿cation result (see Wolpin, 1987). Our analysis exploits the ￿nite-horizon backward-
induction structure of our model in conjunction with outcome data to secure identi￿cation
and does not rely on arbitrary period by period exclusion restrictions. We substantially
depart from the assumptions maintained in Rust￿s nonidenti￿cation theorem (1994). We
achieve identi￿cation by using more information and exploiting the structure of our ￿nite
horizon nonrecurrent model. Nonstationarity of regressors greatly facilitates identi￿cation
by producing both exclusion and curvature restrictions which can substitute for exclusion
restrictions. We leave exploration of identi￿cation of an in￿nite horizon version of our model
with recurrent states in a stationary environment for another occasion.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper develops two econometric models of time to treatment (or dropout) and associ-
ated systems of outcomes generated at diﬀerent treatment times. A third benchmark model
for a conventional static discrete choice framework with counterfactuals is developed in Ap-
pendix B. Our semiparametric analysis of a dynamic discrete choice model with associated
outcomes allows for general time series processes for the unobservables and agent learning.
We do not make parametric assumptions about model unobservables. The outcomes we an-
alyze may be discrete, continuous or mixed discrete-continuous random variables, although
in this paper we focus on the continuous outcome case in analyzing structural models. We
establish conditions for semiparametric identi￿cation of these models, and we develop the
counterfactuals that can be produced by each model. Our identi￿cation analysis of the
time to treatment is of interest in its own right and constitutes an independent contribu-
tion to the semiparametric analysis of dynamic discrete choice models. Our explicit choice
65theoretic model is suitable for the analysis of outcomes associated with diﬀerent times to
treatment in conjunction with choice data on times to treatment. The cross-equation restric-
tions generated by choice theory and the nonstationarity induced by agent ￿nite horizons
help to identify agent preferences (costs) and agent information sets. Access to measurement
equations is helpful in identifying the unobservables associated with cost functions, and in
constructing distributions of outcomes across stopping times, measurements are not needed
for identi￿cation of choice equations or of state-speci￿c outcome equations. We identify ex
ante and ex post objective and subjective evaluations of outcomes and allow for updating of
expected rewards and stopping times as information accumulates over the life cycle.
The reduced form models we analyze cannot identify treatment eﬀects motivated by
choice theory such as the marginal treatment eﬀect (MTE). They also generate certain
counterfactuals that are diﬃcult to interpret and can violate basic principles of causality.
The benchmark multinomial discrete choice model with associated outcomes developed in
Appendix B rules out option values but that can produce all of the conventional ex post
treatment eﬀects.
Heckman and Navarro (2006) present estimates of option values and compare the pre-
dictive performance of static and structural models. Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005d)
consider identi￿cation of a generalized ordered discrete choice model with stochastic thresh-
olds that rules out many of the perversities associated with the unrestricted reduced form
time to treatment model but at the cost of eliminating option values. Our paper demon-
strates the value of articulated economic choice models in elucidating the structure of statis-
tical treatment eﬀect models and in identifying parameters of costs, preferences and returns.
66Appendices
AT h e M a t z k i n C o n d i t i o n s
Consider a binary choice model, D = 1(ϕ(Z) >V),w h e r eZ is observed and V is unobserved.
Let ϕ∗ denote the true ϕ and let F∗
V denote the the true cdf of V .L e tZ ∈ Z. Let Γ denote
the set of monotone increasing functions from R into [0,1]. Assume
(i) ϕ∗ : Z → R,w h e r eZ ⊂ RK and ϕ∗ ∈ Φ,w h e r eΦ is a set of functions mapping Z into
R that are continuous and strictly increasing in their Kth coordinate.
(ii) Z ⊥ ⊥ V
(iii) The conditional distribution of the Kth coordinate of Z has a Lebesgue density that is
everywhere positive conditional on the other coordinates of Z.
(iv) F∗
V is strictly increasing.
(v) The support of the marginal distribution of Z is included in Z.
Then (ϕ∗,F∗
V) is identi￿ed within Φ ￿ Γ if and only if Φ is a set of functions such that no
two functions in Φ are strictly increasing transformations of each other (Matzkin, 1994).
She also shows that the following alternative representations of functional forms satisfy
the conditions for exact identi￿cation for ϕ(Z).
1. ϕ(Z)=Zγ, kγk =1or γ1 =1 .
2. ϕ(Z) is homogeneous of degree one attains a given value α,a tZ = z∗ (e.g. cost
functions).
3. Least concave functions that attain common values at two points in their domain.
4. Additively separable functions:
67(a) Functions additively separable into a continuous and monotone increasing function
and a continuous monotone increasing, concave and homogeneous of degree one
function.
(b) Functions additively separable into the value of one variable and a continuous,
monotone increasing function of the remaining variables
(c) Additively separable functions, e.g. ϕ(Z)=Z1 + τ(Z2,...,Z K)
BI d e n t i ￿cation of Counterfactual Outcomes for a Multino-
mial Discrete Choice Model with State-Contingent
Outcomes
Let outcomes in state s be Y (s,X)=μY (s,X)+U (s), s =1 ,...,ﬂ S, where there are ﬂ S
discrete states. Let V (s,Z)=μV (s,Z)+η(s).T h eU (s) and η(s),s=1 ,...,ﬂ S are assumed
to be continuous and measurably separated as a collection of random variables. Thus the
support of one random variable does not restrict the supports of the other random variables.










Matzkin (1993) considers identi￿cation of polychotomous discrete choice models under the
conditions of the Theorem B.1 below. We extend her analysis by adjoining counterfactual
outcomes associated with each choice. We can identify μY (s,X),s =1 ,...,ﬂ S over the
support of X; μV (s,Z), up to scale over the support of Z and the joint distributions of
¡
U (s),η(s) − η(1),...,η(s) − η(s − 1),η(s) − η(s +1 ) ,...,η(s) − η(ﬂ S)
¢
with the contrasts









are continuous random variables (absolutely contin-
uous with respect to Lebesgue measure).



















Supp(μV (s,X) − μV (s0,X)),s =1 ,...,ﬂ S
(iv) Supp
¡










U (s),η(s) − η(1),...,η(s) − η(ﬂ S)
¢
⊥ ⊥ (X,Z) s =1 ,...,ﬂ S
Then μY (s,X),s=1 ,...,ﬂ S,is identi￿ed;
¡




are identi￿ed up to a common scale for all s =1 ,...,ﬂ S, and the distribution of (U (s),η(s)−
η(1),...,η(s) − η(ﬂ S)) is identi￿ed, the last ﬂ S − 1 components up to a common scale.
Proof. This theorem follows from an application of Theorem 3 in CHH. Because of (iii)w e




and we can identify the μY (s,X),s=1 ,...,ﬂ S in those limit sets. We can then vary μY (s,X)
and trace out the marginal distribution of the U (s),s=1 ,...,ﬂ S. By similar reasoning, we
identify the (μV (s,X)−μV (1,X),...,μ V (s,X)−μV
¡ﬂ S,X
¢
) up to scale. We can, by virtue
of (iv), trace out the joint distribution of
¡
U (s),η(s) − η(1),...,η(s) − η(ﬂ S)
¢
, s =1 ,...,ﬂ S
with the last ﬂ S coordinates identi￿ed up to scale on the unobservables. ¥
Invoking the Matzkin conditions we can set the scale of the deterministic functions. If
we invoke her functions up to an unknown scale, we only identify the functions up to scale.
We identify the μY (s,X) and the scaled version of
69(μV (s,X) − μV (1,X),...,μ V (s,X) − μV
¡ﬂ S,X
¢
) o v e rt h es u p p o r t so fX and Z respec-
tively. Exclusion restrictions are the traditional way to satisfy conditions (iii)a n d( iv)b u t
these are not required as the argument of Corollary 1 of Theorem 1 proved in Appendix C
demonstrates. With minor modi￿cation, the proof structure of this corollary can be adapted
to this setting. Matzkin (1993) provides conditions for identi￿cation of the V (j,Z) in the
random utility case with conventional structure.
From this model, we can identify the marginal treatment eﬀect (CHH, p. 368, equa-
tion (71)) and all pairwise average treatment eﬀects by forming suitable limit sets. We
can also identify all pairwise mean treatment on the treated and mean treatment on the
untreated eﬀects.
In the general case, we can identify the densities of U (s),η(s) − η(1),...,η(s) − η(ﬂ S),
s =1 ,...,ﬂ S,where U (s) may be a vector and the contrasts are identi￿ed up to a scale which
we now de￿ne. Set Va r(η(s)) = 1 for all s =1 ,...,ﬂ S − 1.S e tμV
¡ﬂ S,Z
¢
≡ 0 and η(ﬂ S) ≡







=1| Z = z
¢¢
, we can identify the pairwise
correlations ρi,j = Correl(η(i),η(j)),i ,j=1 ,...,ﬂ S − 1. We assume that −1 ≤ ρi,j < 1.I f
ρi,j =1for some i,j, the choice of a normalization is not innocuous. Under our assumptions,
we can identify Va r(η(s) − η( )) = 2
¡
1 − ρs, 
¢
.D e ￿ne τs,  =[ Va r(η(s) − η( ))]1/2 where
positive square roots are used. This is used to set the scale for contrast s, .
Consider constructing the distribution of Y ( ,X) given D(s)=1 ,X,Z.I f  6= s,t h i si sa
counterfactual distribution. From this distribution we can construct, among many possible
counterfactual parameters, E (Y (s,X) − Y ( ,X) | D(s)=1 ,X= x,Z = z), at r e a t m e n t




⎝Y (s,X) − Y ( ,X)
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
V (s,Z)=V ( ,Z),







the eﬀect of moving from state   to state s for people at the margin of indiﬀerence between
75This is one of many possible normalizations.
70s and  .76







for any   6= s
f r o mt h eo u t p u to fT h e o r e mB . 1 ,w eu s et h en o r m a l i z e dv e r s i o n so fη(s) − η(1),...,η(s) −
η(ﬂ S):
(η(s)−η(1))
τs,1 ,..., (η(s)−η(ﬂ S))
τs, ﬂ S . From the density of U ( ),
(η( )−η(1))
τ ,1 ,..., (η( )−η(ﬂ S))
τ , ﬂ S which
we identify from Theorem B.1, we can transform the contrast variables in the following way.
De￿ne q( ,s)=
(η( )−η(s))
τ ,s . Observe that q(s,j)=
η(s)−η(j)
τs,j =
q( ,j)τ ,j−q( ,s)τ ,s
τs,j for all
j =1 ,2,...,ﬂ S. Replace
η(s)−η(j)
τs,j by
q( ,j)τ ,j−q( ,s)τ ,s
τs,j j =1 ,2,...,ﬂ S, j 6=   in the density of
(U ( ),
(η( )−η(s))
τ ,s ,...,(η( )−η(ﬂ S))
τ ,ﬂ S ) and use the Jacobian of transformation
Q
j=1,...,ﬂ S,j6=  |τ ,j|,
where ￿|| ￿ denotes determinant. Thus we can generate the desired counterfactual density
for all s =1 ,...,ﬂ S. Provided that the Jacobians are nonzero (which rules out perfect
dependence, ρ ,s 6=1 ,   6= s), we preserve all of the information and can construct the
marginal distribution of any U ( ) for any desired pattern of latent indices. Thus we can
construct the desired counterfactuals.
The key diﬀerence between this model and the one developed in Section 2 in the text is
that across all counterfactual states the same collection of random variables generates the
D(s), s =1 ,...,ﬂ S. In contrast, in the model of Sections 2 and Section 3, new random
variables are added at each stage of the time to treatment process. If we control the prolif-
eration of unobservables, as we do in the factor model of Section 2.5, we can identify all of
the traditional counterfactual means and the distributions of outcomes as well.
76Heckman (2006) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2006a) call this parameter EOTM,t h ee ﬀect of treatment
for people at the margin.
71CI d e n t i ￿cation Proofs
Proof. (Theorem 1) Let
Sη(1)(z(1)γ1)=1 − Fη(1)(z(1)γ1)
=1 − Pr(D(1) = 1 | Z(1) = z(1))
=P r ( D(1) = 0 | Z(1) = z(1))
=P r ( z(1)γ1 <η(1) | Z(1) = z(1)).
Similarly let
Sη(1),η(2)(z(1)γ1,z(2)γ2)=P r( z(1)γ1 <η(1) ∧ z(2)γ2 <η(2) | Z(1) = z(1),Z(2) = z(2))
and so forth. By hypothesis, we know the left hand sides of the following ﬂ T equations:
Pr(D(1) = 0 | Z(1) = z(1)) = Sη(1) (z(1)γ1) (C.1)
















⎠ = Sη(1),...,η( ﬂ T)
¡
z(1)γ1,...,z(ﬂ T)γ ﬂ T
¢
.
We may treat the ￿rst equation as a binary discrete choice model. Following the analysis
of Manski (1988, Proposition 2, Corollary 5), under the conditions of the theorem we can
identify γ1 and Sη(1) up to scale and location. For example, we may normalize the location
and scale by assuming E(η(1)) = 0 and by requiring that kγ1k =1 ,w h e r ekγ1k is the norm
of the vector γ1.
We cannot directly apply Manski￿s analysis for T ≥ 2. We do not directly observe
Pr(D(2) = 0 | Z(2)),s i n c et h eD(2) outcome is not observed for individuals with D(1) = 1.
72We therefore proceed with a recursive ￿identi￿cation in the limit￿ argument.





, then given the identi￿cation of the ￿rst
period parameters which we just established, the second period parameters are identi￿ed,





∈ Γ2 ￿H 2 with (Sη∗(2),γ∗
2) 6=( Sη0(2),γ0
2),






























. We now show that (C.2) holds for some ϕ>0.





Sη0(1) (g1) ≤ ε/2 for all g1 ≥ ￿ g1 =⇒ sup
g2
ﬂ ﬂSη0(1),η0(2) (g1,g 2) − Sη0(2) (g2)




ﬂ ﬂSη0(1),η∗(2) (g1,g 2) − Sη∗(2) (g2)
ﬂ ﬂ ≤ ε/2 (C.4)
for all g1 ≥ ￿ g1. The triangle inequality implies that











2) − Sη∗(2) (Z(2)γ∗
2)
⁄
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
≤ ε. (C.5)












ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
>ϕ
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
Z(1)γ
0














ﬂ ﬂ >ϕ+ ε
ﬂ ﬂZ(1)γ
0
1 ≥ max(￿ g1, ø g1)
¢
.77




max(￿ g1, ￿ g1)) = 1 iﬀ (Sη∗(2),γ∗
2)=( Sη0(2),γ0
2).S i n c e (Sη∗(2),γ∗
2) 6=( Sη0(2),γ0
2), and since we
can set ε arbitrarily small, there exists ϕ values such that the last probability is strictly












ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
>ϕ
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
Z(1)γ
0




Using (iv), we have that the conditioning set in (C.2) has positive probability
Pr(Z(1)γ
0
1 ≥ max(￿ g1,￿ g1)) > 0,
so that (C.2) holds. We have shown that (Sη∗(2),γ∗
2) 6=( Sη0(2),γ0
2) implies (C.2), and thus
the (Sη0(2),γ0
2) parameters are identi￿ed. Proceeding in this fashion, we can recover Z(t)γ0
t,
t =1 ,...,ﬂ T. Since we identify Z(t)γ0
t using (iv), we can recover the joint distribution of
(η(1),...,η(ﬂ T)) varying the components of (Z(1)γ0
1,...,Z(ﬂ T)γ0
ﬂ T) to trace out Sη(1),...,η(ﬂ T) and
hence we can recover Fη(1),...,η(ﬂ T). ¥
Proof. (Corollary 1) Let
zγ1 = g1.
Recall that kγtk =1for some t =1 ,...,T∗, is our normalization. The ￿rst T∗ coordinates










where in this expression, lower case zi is the ith coordinate of z.
In the index zγ2 use Gaussian elimination and substitute for z1 from the preceding
77The intuition for this result is that if the ￿rst term inside (C.5) is bigger than ϕ in absolute value, the
second term in (C.5) must be within ϕ–ε in absolute value since the two terms live in a narrow band de￿ned
by ε.











γ21 + γ22z2 + •••+ γ2KzK. (C.6)
Under assumption (iii) of Theorem 1 as amended in assumption (v) in the statement of
Corollary 1, these variables can be freely varied given zγ1 = g1. Proceeding recursively, in
the (j+1)th argument, (j<T ∗), we obtain an expression that substitutes out for (z1,...,z j)
leaving T∗ − j free continuous variables and ﬂ T − j total remaining variables.
Array the γj into a matrix C with the jth column of C being γj. C is a K ￿ ﬂ T matrix.
Let C(r,n) be the n￿r submatrix of C consisting of the ￿rst n rows and r columns, and let
C(r,K − n) be the matrix consisting of the last K − n rows and the ￿rst r columns of C.




and the last K −e elements γj(K −e). Finally,
let ￿ zj be the last ﬂ T −j elements of z and ￿ γj denote the parameters associated with them at
the jth step of the Gaussian elimination process.





Successive Gaussian elimination produces
￿ γj+1 = γj+1 (K − j) − C (j,K − j)[C (j,j)]
−1 γj+1 (j)
a K−j dimensional vector. In order for [C(j,j)]−1 to exist, j =1 ,...,T∗, it is necessary that
γ1,...,γj be linearly independent vectors. Condition (v)a s s u r e su st h a tt h i sr e q u i r e m e n ti s
satis￿ed for j ≤ T∗.D e ￿ne ￿ γj+1 (T∗ − j) as the ￿rst (T∗−j) elements of ￿ γj+1 associated with











is obtained using the same linear transformation that is used
to obtain ￿ γj+1 with j =1 .S i n c e ￿ γ2(g1) is a function of g1, the second period index is a
function of g1 and for ￿xed ￿ z2 we have that g1 →∞=⇒ g2 →∞ . However, note that using
assumptions (iii) and (v) of Theorem 1 and assumptions (v)a n d( vi) of the corollary, we can
send g1 →∞while varying ￿ z2 to keep g2 ￿xed. In particular, we can use z1 to send g1 →∞
and set z2 to compensate for z1 in the second period index so as to hold g2 ￿xed. Thus,
Supp(Zγ2|Zγ1 = g1)=R and the Z that satisfy Zγ1 = g1 will have rank K − 1 for a.e.
g1 ∈ R. Moreover, we have, for a.e. g1 ∈ R, Supp(Zγ2|Zγ1 ≥ g1)=R and the Z that satisfy
Zγ1 ≥ g1 has full rank (there exists no proper linear subspace of RK having probability 1
under FZ|Zγ1≥g1). We can repeat this argument, using sequential Gaussian elimination as
described above, to show that
Supp
¡
Zγt|Zγ1 = g1,...,Zγt−1 = gt−1
¢
= R, t ≤ T
∗,
and there exists no proper linear subspace of RK having probability 1 under FZ|Zγ1≥g1,...,Zγt≥gt
for almost every (gt−1,...,g 1) ∈ Rt−1 for t =2 ,...,ﬂ T. Using the argument in Cameron
and Heckman (1998), we can identify all the remaining parameters of the model (γt, for
t =1 ,...,T∗, up to scale and location normalizations). ¥
DI d e n t i ￿cation of the General Model of Section 2
This appendix generalizes the analysis of Theorems 2 and 3 in the text. Use Y (a,t) as short-
hand for Y (a,t,X,U (a,t)). Ignore (for notational simplicity) the mixed discrete-continuous
outcome case. We can build that case from the continuous and discrete cases and for the sake
76of brevity we do not analyze it here. We also do not analyze duration outcomes although it is

















d,j (a,t) ≥ 0
¢
.79
From standard results in the discrete choice literature, without additional information, we
can only know Y ∗
d,j (a,t) up to scale.
We assume an additively separable model for the continuous variables and latent contin-
uous indices. Making the X explicit, we have
Yc (a,t,X)=μc (a,t,X)+Uc (a,t)
Y
∗
d (a,t,X)=μd (a,t,X) − Ud (a,t)
1 ≤ t ≤ ﬂ T,1 ≤ a ≤ ﬂ A.
We array the Yc (a,t,X) i n t oam a t r i xYc (t,X) and the Y ∗
d (a,t,X) into a matrix Y ∗
d (t,X).
We decompose these vectors into components corresponding to the means μc (t,X),μ d (t,X)
and the unobservables Uc (t),U d (t).T h u s
Yc (t,X)=μc (t,X)+Uc (t)
Y
∗
d (t,X)=μd (t,X) − Ud (t).
78The ingredients for doing so are in Corollary 2 of Theorem 3
79Extensions to nonbinary discrete outcomes are straightforward. Thus we could entertain, at greater
notational cost, a multinomial outcome model at each age a for each counterfactual state, building on the
analysis of Appendix B.
77Y ∗
d (t,X) generates Yd (t,X). To simplify the notation, we will make use of the condensed
forms Yc (X), Y ∗




d (X)=μd (X) − Ud.
Following CHH, and Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005a,b,c,e), we may also have a
system of measurements with both discrete and continuous components. The measurements
are not t-indexed. They are the same for each stopping time. (Hansen, Heckman, and
Mullen, 2004, generalize a version of the model discussed in this section to allow for t-speci￿c
measurements.) We write the equations for the measurements in an additively separable
form, in a fashion comparable to those of the outcomes. The equations for the continuous
measurements and latent indices producing discrete measurements are
Mc (a,X)=μc,M (a,X)+Uc,M (a)
M
∗
d (a,X)=μd,M (a,X) − Ud,M (a)






d,j (a,X) ≥ 0
¢
.
The measurements play the role of indicators unaﬀected by the process being studied. We
array Mc (a,X) and M∗
d (a,X) into matrices Mc (X) and M∗
d (X).W e a r r a y μc,M (a,X),
μd,M (a,X) into matrices μc,M (X) and μd,M (X). We array the corresponding unobservables




d (X)=μd,M (X) − Ud,M.
78We use the notation of Section 2.4 to write I (t)=Ψ(t,Z)−η(t) and collect I (t),Ψ(t,Z)
and η(t) into vectors I, μ(Z), η.W ed e ￿ne ηt =( η(1),...,η(t)) and Ψt (Z)=( Ψ(1,Z),...,
Ψ(t,Z)). Using this notation, we extend the analysis of CHH to identify our model assuming
that (Yc,Y d,M c,M d,I) are independently distributed across people.
Theorem D.1. The joint distribution of (Uc (t),U d (t),U c,M,U d,M,η t) is identi￿ed (the
components corresponding to discrete outcomes up to scale) along with the mean functions
(μc (t,X),μ d (X),μ c,M (X),μ d,M (X), Ψt (Z)) with mean functions for the Ψt (Z) and the
discrete outcome components belonging to the Matzkin class of functions if
(i) (Uc,U d,U c,M,U d,M,η t) are continuous random variables with zero means, ￿nite vari-
ances and support: Supp(Uc) ￿ Supp(Ud) ￿ Supp(Uc,M) ￿ Supp(Ud,M) ￿ Supp(ηt)
with upper and lower limits





tively. These conditions are assumed to apply within each component of each subvector.
The joint system is thus measurably separable (variation free) for each component with
respect to every other component.
(ii) (Uc,U d,U c,M,U d,M,η t) ⊥ ⊥ (X,Z).
(iii) Supp
¡












and a comparable condition holds for all subcomponents;
(iv) Supp
¡
μd (t,X),μ d,M (X),Ψt (Z)
¢
⊇ Supp(Ud (t),U d,M,η t),
where ηt =( η(1),...,η(t)) collects the ￿rst t elements of η.
Proof. From the data on Yc (t,X),Y d (t,X),M c (X),M d (X) for D(t)=1 ,D t−1 =( 0 ) ,a n d






Yc (t,X) ≤ yc (t,X),μ d (t,X) ≤ Ud (t),
Mc (X) ≤ mc (X),μ d,M (t,X) ≤ Ud,M
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
D(t)=1 ,D



























fUc(t),Ud(t),Uc,M,Ud,M,ηt (uc (t),u d (t),u c,M,u d,M,η(1),...,η(t))
•dη (1)•••dη(t)dud,M duc,M dud (t) duc (t)
(Recall that D(0) = 0 is ￿xed outside the model.)
Under assumptions (i)-(iv),f o ra l lx ∈ Supp(X),w ec a nv a r yt h eΨ(j,Z),j=1 ,...,t
and obtain a limit set Z such that lim
z→Z
Pr(D(t)=1 ,D t−1 =( 0 )| X = x,Z = z)=1 .W ec a n
identify the joint distribution of Yc (t,X),Y d (t,X),M c (X),M d (X) free of selection bias for
all t =1 ,...,ﬂ T in this limit set. We identify the parameters of Yd (t,X), t =1 ,...,ﬂ T,a n d
Md (X) only up to scale normalizations. We know the limit set given the functional forms
for the Ψ(t,Z) used in Theorem 1 or in Matzkin (1992, 1993, 1994).
As a consequence of (ii),w ec a ni d e n t i f yμc (t,X),μ c,M (X) directly from the means of
the limit outcome distributions. We can thus identify all pairwise average treatment eﬀects
E (Yc (t,X) | X = x) − E (Yc (t0,X) | X = x) for all t,t0 and any other linear functionals
derived from the distributions of the continuous variables de￿ned at t and t0.I d e n t i ￿cation
o ft h em e a n sa n dd i s t r i b u t i o n so ft h el a t e n tv a r i a b l e sg i v i n gr i s et ot h ed i s c r e t eo u t c o m e si s
more subtle. The argument required is the same as that used in the ￿rst step of the proof
of Theorem 1. With one continuous regressor among the X, one can identify the marginal
distributions of the Ud (t) and the Ud,M (up to scale if the Matzkin functions are only speci￿ed
80up to scale). To identify the joint distributions of Ud (t) and Ud,M o n em u s ti n v o k eav e r s i o n
of condition (iii) used in the proof of Theorem 1.
Thus for system t, suppose that there are Nd,t discrete outcome components with asso-
ciated means μd,j (t,X) and error terms Ud,j (t),j=1 ,...,N d,t. As a consequence of condi-





Supp(μd (t,X)) ⊇ Supp(Ud (t)). We thus can trace out the joint distribution of Ud (t) and
identify it (up to scale if we specify the Matzkin class only up to scale). By a parallel ar-
gument for the measurements, we can identify the joint distribution of Ud,M.L e tNd,M be














these conditions, we can trace out the joint distribution of Ud,M and identify it (up to scale
for Matzkin class of functions speci￿ed up to scale) within the limit sets.
In the general case, we can vary each limit of the integral in (D.1) independently and
trace out the full joint distribution of (Uc (t),U d (t),U c,M,U d,M,η(1),...,η(t)).F o rf u r t h e r
discussion, see the analysis in CHH, Theorem 3. ¥
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